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Executive pay and performance: The moderating effect of CEO power and governance structure 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the crucial question of whether chief executive officer (CEO) power and 
corporate governance (CG) structure can moderate the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) using a 
large up-to-date South African dataset. Our findings are three-fold. First, when direct links between 
executive pay and performance are examined, we find a positive, but relatively small PPS. Second, our 
results show that in a context of concentrated ownership and weak board structures; the second-tier 
agency conflict (director monitoring power and opportunism) is stronger than the first-tier agency 
problem (CEO power and self-interest). Third, additional analysis suggests that CEO power and CG 
structure have a moderating effect on the PPS. Specifically, we find that the PPS is higher in firms with 
more reputable, founding and shareholding CEOs, higher ownership by directors and institutions, and 
independent nomination and remuneration committees, but lower in firms with larger boards, more 
powerful, and long-tenured CEOs. Overall, our evidence sheds new important theoretical and empirical 
insights on explaining the PPS with specific focus on the predictions of the optimal contracting and 
managerial power hypotheses. The findings are generally robust across a raft of econometric models 
that control for different types of endogeneities, pay, and performance proxies. 
 
Keywords:  executive pay; corporate performance; corporate governance; CEO power, endogeneity, 
South Africa. 
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Introduction 
 
Agency theory has suggested a number of different mechanisms, including incentive alignment (pay) 
and monitoring (CG) for resolving agency problems in modern corporations, whereby ownership is 
separate from control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Lee et al., 1995; Sanchez-Marin & Baixauli-Soler, 2014). 
However, while the overall aim for designing executive pay contracts is to align the interests of owners and 
managers, such incentive contracts could themselves result in additional agency conflicts (Bonache & 
Fernandez, 1997; McKnight & Tomkins, 1999; Ding et al., 2006; Balafas & Florackis, 2014). Not 
surprisingly, the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) literature is underpinned by two sharply contrasting 
incentive alignment theories: optimal contracting theory (OCT) and managerial power hypothesis (MPH) 
(Murphy, 1985, 1999; Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Bebchuk et al., 2002; van Essen et al., 2015). The OCT 
posits that when properly designed, executive pay and incentive contracts can serve as powerful tools 
through which performance can be improved by reducing agency conflicts and closely aligning the interests 
of owners and managers (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Romero & Cabrera, 2001; Cho et al., 2014); hence 
predicting a strong positive PPS. By contrast, the MPH suggests that managers typically have great power 
to set their own pay, and that they use that power to expropriate shareholders‟ wealth (Bebchuk & Fried, 
2003, 2004; Bloom et al., 2003; Tien & Chen, 2012); thus expecting the PPS to be relatively small. 
The results of a considerable number of studies that have examined the link between director pay and 
performance suggest a positive, but relatively small PPS (Frydman & Saks, 2010; Goergen & Renneboog, 
2011; Pepper et al., 2013), with some suggesting that performance (firm size) can explain as low (high) as 
less than 5% (over 40%) of the differences in executive pay (Tosi et al., 2000; Reddy et al., 2015). 
However, whilst these appear to provide support for the MPH (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010; Frydman & 
Jenter, 2010; Blanco & Golik, 2015), it is quite apparent from the analyses of previous studies that a 
number of other reasons may also explain their evidence of relatively small PPS (Conyon, 1997; Gomez-
Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Berrone et al., 2008; DeVaro & Fung, 2014; Sanchez et al., 2010).  
First, within the MPH, two distinct agency problems arise when setting executive pay arrangements: 
primary and secondary (Ding et al., 2014, 2015; Guo et al., 2015). The primary (first-tier) agency problem 
relates to the power that CEOs may have in setting their own pay, and in rigging the director selection 
process so that the independence of the board is compromised (Morse et al., 2011). The secondary (second-
tier) agency problem concerns the apparent conflict of interests faced by directors in deciding both their 
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own pay and that of the CEO. With compromised boards, the CEO will have extra power to influence the 
re-appointment, as well as the incentive contracts, of the current directors (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010). 
This can engender a culture of mutual-favour or reciprocity, whereby an overly generous CEO pay 
arrangement is approved by the board in return for favourable pay packages for the directors, and thereby 
equally leading to excessive rent extraction. However, and whilst the first-tier agency problem has been 
widely investigated, the effect of the second-tier agency conflict on the PPS has seldom been investigated 
(Core et al., 1999, 2003).  
Second, and of close relevance to our study, existing studies that have investigated the PPS by 
employing changes in pay and performance have also often done so by examining direct links between pay 
and performance without accounting for the effect of both incentive alignment (pay) and monitoring (CG) 
mechanisms (Main et al., 1996; Tosi et al., 2000). Further and whilst a limited number of prior studies have 
taken into account the role of CG when estimating the PPS (Chahine & Goergen, 2011; Conyon & He, 
2011, 2012), they have mostly done so by examining direct effect of CG on the PPS without considering 
any potential interactions that may exist between monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms (Lin, 
2005; Chen et al., 2011). By contrast, studies assessing the extent to which CEO power and CG features 
may affect the PPS are rare (Cornett et al., 2009; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Li & Srinivasan, 2011; Wowak et 
al., 2011). A major methodological implication is that failing to a sufficiently complex model of the PPS, 
that simultaneously examines the effects of both incentive alignment and monitoring mechanisms, can 
result in endogenous associations (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Gil-Alana et al., 2011). Existing studies, 
however, have mainly explored direct links between pay and performance, and thereby crucially ignored 
endogeneity problems that may be posed by the possible joint use of incentive alignment and monitoring 
mechanisms when estimating the PPS, and we argue that this may also explain the small PPS. 
Finally, similar to most developing countries, SA firms face unique governance challenges in 
comparison with their developed counterparts. Concentrated ownership (La Porta et al., 1999), weak 
investor protection (La Porta et al., 2000), ineffective board structures (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Peng et al., 
2008), inactive external governance mechanisms (Young et al., 2008; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013), and 
consequently, lower market valuation of public corporations (La Porta et al., 2002), are easily observable. 
In fact, Conyon and Murphy (2000) and Firth et al. (2006, 2007) show that executive pay differs 
substantially across countries due to variations in legal, institutional, cultural and CG practices. However, 
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past studies are concentrated in the UK and US, which present comparatively similar institutional contexts 
(Mehran, 1995; Zheng, 2010). In developing countries with different institutional settings, with particular 
regard to CG reforms, ownership structures and executive pay incentives, the PPS can be expected to differ 
from that identified in industrialised countries. As such, studying the PPS in developing countries, where 
empirical evidence is scarce, arguably contributes to a more complete understanding of the link. 
Consequently, the current study seeks to extend, as well as make a number of new contributions to the 
extant literature by addressing some of the articulated limitations of prior studies. First, we investigate the 
extent to which the PPS can be moderated by CEO power and CG qualities over a ten-year period. Our 
results contribute to the literature by showing that the PPS differs depending on CEO power and CG 
structures. Second, given the separate agency conflicts that can arise from incentive contracts, we 
distinctively and explicitly examine both the effects of the primary (CEO pay) and secondary (all executive 
directors‟ pay) agency problems on the PPS. Our findings contribute to the literature by indicating that in a 
context of concentrated ownership and weak board structures; the second-tier (monitoring power and 
opportunism of other directors) agency conflict is stronger than the first-tier (CEO power and opportunism) 
agency problem. Finally, our results contribute to the literature by indicating that the PPS for both the CEO 
and all executive directors is generally small, but relatively strong in better-governed firms. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The following sections review the literature, 
outline research design, report empirical analyses and provide a conclusion.  
 
 
Theory, prior empirical literature and hypotheses development 
 
In modern corporations, ownership tends to be diverse, whilst control is often in the hands of a few 
professional managers (Berrone et al., 2008; Ntim et al., 2015a, b). This generates a classic agency conflict, 
where opportunistic managers may not always work in the best interests of owners. Different mechanisms, 
including incentive alignment (pay) and monitoring (CG) have, therefore, been suggested to motivate 
managers to work in the best interests of owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Al-Bassam et al., 2016; Al-
Bassam & Ntim, 2016). A major way of aligning the interests of owners and managers is to design 
appropriate pay incentives (Morse et al., 2011; Pepper et al., 2013), and this is the central rationale 
underlying a number of executive pay and CG reforms that have been pursued around the world (Cadbury, 
1992; King, 2002). Discernibly, the crucial question, as to whether such executive pay incentives are 
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effective in improving performance has equally generated a considerable theoretical and empirical literature 
(See Murphy, 1999; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Tosi et al., 2000; Core et al., 2003; Finkelstein et al., 
2009; Frydman & Jenter, 2010; Chen et al., 2011; van Essen et al., 2015 for comprehensive reviews). 
Theoretically, there are two major contrasting views: OCT and MPH (Murphy, 1985; Bebchuk & Fried, 
2003). The OCT considers executive pay packages as a result of arm‟s length dealing between independent 
corporate boards and executives that leads to the creation of efficient managerial incentive contracts that 
can align the interests of owners and managers (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; He et al., 2014). Therefore, OCT 
predicts a strong positive PPS, due to the assumption that executives have less control in setting their own 
pay (Dong et al., 2010; Upneja & Ozdemir, 2014).  
In contrast, the MPH considers executive pay arrangements as a product of close negotiations between 
powerful executives and weak boards, which leads to the creation of inefficient managerial contracts that 
exacerbate agency problems (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Sapp, 2008). It should be noted that excessive 
managerial power can create two distinct agency conflicts. A first-tier agency conflict relates to the ability 
of the CEO to manipulate director appointment in order to gain control over board decisions that can 
facilitate excessive rent extraction (Gomez-Mejia eta al., 1987). A second-tier agency problem arises 
because directors may reward a CEO with an excessively high pay in return for a similar and reciprocal 
support from the CEO (Core et al., 2003; Morse et al., 2011). As executives are assumed to set their own 
pay (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003, 2004), the MPH expects a small, but not necessarily negative PPS, as it is 
possible for managers to be paid for „luck‟ (i.e., for improved performance outside executive control) 
(Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001). 
The extant empirical literature on executive pay is not only inconclusive, but also disproportionately 
concentrated in the UK and US (Gomez-Mejia eta al., 1987; Hubbard & Palia, 1995; Main et al., 1996; 
Zheng, 2010 Balafas & Florackis, 2014; Kale et al., 2014; Kuo et al., 2014). These studies generally report 
a positive, but small PPS; although US studies document a relatively stronger PPS than their UK 
counterparts (Conyon & Murphy, 2000; Tosi et al., 2000). Using a sample of 1,049 US firms from 1974 to 
1976, Jensen and Murphy (1990) reported positive PPS. Main et al. (1996) reported a similar, but smaller 
finding for a sample of 60 UK companies from 1981 to 1989. Whilst this appears to provide support for the 
MPH, early UK and US studies generally display a major limitation in that they include only a small 
number of control variables, especially CG mechanisms that can potentially affect the PPS.  
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In response to the latter problem, subsequent UK (Benito & Conyon, 1999; Dong & Ozkan, 2008; 
Balafas & Florackis, 2014) and US (Mehran, 1995; Core et al., 1999; Dong, 2014; Upneja & Ozdemir, 
2014) studies have mostly examined the PPS by controlling for a raft of CG variables. These studies 
generally report similar small PPS. A limitation of these studies is that they typically do not explicitly 
address the potential endogeneity problems that may arise from the possible joint use of executive pay and 
CG by firms to minimise agency problems. These studies have also mostly examined the PPS for CEOs 
rather than other executive directors. These may explain the noticeably small PPS that has been reported by 
past studies (Dong, 2014; van Essen et al., 2015). 
 A small number of non UK and US studies have generally reported positive and, in contrast, 
comparatively stronger PPS (Cho et al., 2014; Ding et al., 2015). This indicates that the PPS may differ 
according to country-level institutional features, as well as company-specific characteristics. In particular, 
contextual differences in the effectiveness of board and ownership structures, legal, regulatory and 
enforcement environment, and markets (e.g., capital, control, labour, product and services) can explain the 
differences in the level of PPS that is observed across different countries (Li & Srinivasan, 2011; Wowak et 
al., 2011; Sanchez et al., 2010; Sanchez-Marin & Baixauli-Soler, 2014). In the UK and US, for example, 
ownership is often widely held within a fairly strong internal governance structures, and cultural, legal, 
regulatory and enforcement environment. This renders the external (governance) market for capital, 
corporate control, and labour highly active, and thereby serving as additional effective check on managerial 
capacity to expropriate corporate resources through excessive pay. By contrast, in most developing 
countries, such as SA ownership is usually held by a few block holders who usually dominate decisions 
(e.g., board appointments), and thereby weakening the ability of the board to effectively monitor managers. 
Concentrated ownership also renders external governance mechanisms, such as corporate control inactive, 
and thereby placing minority shareholders‟ interest at risk of expropriation by majority shareholders. In 
fact, and as an example of the case of research context potentially accounting for differences in the level of 
PPS that is observed, Sapp (2008) reports positive and higher PPS for 416 Canadian firms from 2000 to 
2005 compared with similar UK and US firms. Studies by Kaplan (1994), Kang and Shivdasani (1995), 
Angel and Fumas (1997), Cheng and Firth (2005) and Merhebi et al. (2006), using German, Japanese, 
Spanish, Hong Kong and Australia companies, respectively, find similar positive and relatively strong PPS.  
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Further, and of direct relevance, the results of a limited number of studies conducted in a number of 
developing countries are largely consistent with the non UK and US evidence. For instance, using a sample 
of 2,104 Chinese firms from 2000 to 2010, Conyon and He (2012) report positive and higher PPS than 
those reported for UK and US companies. Their results are also generally consistent with those of previous 
and recent Chinese studies by Firth et al. (2006, 2007), Kato et al. (2006), Buck et al. (2008), Conyon and 
He (2011) and Ding et al. (2015), as well as those conducted in the emerging markets of Bulgaria, India, 
and Taiwan by Jones and Kato (1996), Kumar and Kaura (2002), and Cho et al. (2014), respectively.  
Therefore, given that the international evidence is broadly consistent with the predictions of the MPH, our 
first hypothesis is that: 
       H1a: The PPS is positive. 
 
As previously explained and within the MPH, two distinct agency problems arise when setting 
executive pay arrangements: primary and secondary (Bebchuk et al., 2002). A first-tier agency conflict 
relates to the ability of the CEO to manipulate director appointment in order to gain control over board 
decisions that can facilitate excessive rent extraction (Gomez-Mejia eta al., 1987). A second-tier agency 
problem arises because directors may reward a CEO with an excessively high pay in return for a similar 
and reciprocal support from the CEO (Morse et al., 2011). Whilst the first-tier agency problem has been 
widely acknowledged and investigated (Frydman & Jenter, 2010), the effect of the second-tier agency 
conflict on the PPS has seldom been investigated (Core et al., 2003). Thus, and given the separate agency 
conflicts that can arise from incentive contracts, we distinctively and explicitly examine both the effects of 
the primary (CEO pay) and secondary (all executive directors‟ pay) agency problems on the PPS. We 
expect that in firms with powerful CEOs and weak monitoring (board and ownership structures) 
mechanisms, incentive contracts will be generously favourable to their CEOs, and therefore a weak PPS, as 
predicted by the MPH. However, in firms with strong governance, we expect that greater and closer 
managerial monitoring will help improve the PPS even in the face of suboptimal CEO incentive contracts, 
as predicted by OCT. We make similar predictions for the pay of all executive directors, but given the 
strategic and influential role of the CEO, the PPS for the CEO is expected to be larger than that of all 
executive directors.  
We seek to test this proposition in SA where recent CG and executive pay reforms that have been 
pursued arguably render it interesting context to do so. Indeed, attempts at improving CG practices in SA 
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companies started with the publication of the first King Report in 1994 (King I) (Armstrong et al., 2006). In 
particular, King I emphasised the importance of properly functioning corporate boards (Ntim et al., 2012a, 
b). With specific regard to directors‟ pay, King I suggested that it should be proposed by a Remuneration 
Committee (RCOM) (see Table 1). However, the report failed to address the composition and independence 
of the committee, and crucially, the form, extent and medium of disclosing information relating to director 
pay (see Table 1; Ntim et al., 2015b, b). Although King I recognised the importance of board sub-
committees, it failed to recommend the establishment of a nomination committee (see Table 1) that would 
nominate new independent directors for appointment to the board (Ntim et al., 2013). Arguably, this 
weakened the power of the RCOM and board to effectively monitor executive incentive contracts under 
King I. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
        During the late 1990s, SA experienced a number of high profile corporate failures, such as the collapse 
of the Macmed, Leisurenet and Nedbank companies, which were attributed mainly to poor CG practices, 
including excessive director pay (Sarra, 2004). These domestic problems in combination with increased 
global attention on CG, resulted in a review of King I and the subsequent publication of a second King 
Report (King II) in 2002. Generally, King II built on and expanded many of the best CG practices of King 
I, including a detailed section that deals with director pay issues (Section 2.5, King II).  
        First and most noticeably, King II recommends that all the members of the RCOM, including the 
chairperson, should be independent non-executive directors (see Table 1; Armstrong et al., 2006). Second, 
to improve the independence of the director selection process, King II explicitly suggested the formation of 
an independent nomination committee consisting of a majority of independent directors, including the 
chairperson. Third, and unlike King I, King II explicitly specifies how executive pay should generally be 
structured, consisting of a fair mix of cash and equity-based incentives that is sufficient to attract, retain and 
motivate executives of the quality required by the board to deliver excellent performance (see Table 1). 
Additionally, it suggests that the views of the CEO may be taken into account by the committee in 
determining the remuneration of other executive directors, but that a CEO should not play any part in 
decisions relating to her/his own pay. Fourth, in addition to the RCOM and board, King II expects 
shareholders, especially institutional ones, to play an active part in setting director pay. An important 
improvement on King I is the requirement that director pay be approved by shareholders at an AGM, in 
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which the chairperson of the RCOM is expected not only to consult the views of the major institutional 
shareholders when setting director pay, but to also be available to answer questions at the AGM (see Table 
1). King II suggests that encouraging greater shareholder activism (i.e., having “say-on-pay”), including 
potential outrage from institutional owners and the general public can help in restraining executive pay.  
        Fifth, and different from King I, King II explicitly indicates the exact items, frequency and medium of 
disclosing information relating to director pay (see Table 1; Malherbe & Segal, 2003). Specifically, it 
suggests that companies should engage in full disclosure of individual executive, non-executive and 
independent director‟s remuneration packages, giving details of fees, salaries, bonuses, pension 
contributions, share options, restraint payments or long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) and all other benefits 
in the annual report. Overall, and in comparison with King I, King II is comprehensive in terms of focus 
and scope, and strengthens the independence and monitoring power of the RCOM, board and shareholders. 
However, it should also be noted that some of the proposals, such as the suggestion for the RCOM to seek 
the views of the CEO when setting the pay packages of other executive directors, could themselves 
potentially give rise to extra agency conflicts (second-tier agency conflict). Additional to the pursuance of 
recent CG reforms is the feature that, unlike the UK and US, ownership of firms is highly concentrated (La 
Porta et al., 1999). The combination of ownership concentration and the historically poor record of 
implementing and enforcing corporate regulations (Malherbe & Segal, 2003), has greatly weakened the 
market for corporate control in SA; giving rise to a number of agency problems, including excessive 
executive pay, often to the detriment of employees and minority shareholders (Sarra, 2004). In this setting, 
it is arguable to expect that the first-tier agency problem to be weaker than the second-tier agency problem 
in the form of smaller PPS relating to the executive directors compared with that of CEOs, and therefore, 
our next hypothesis is that. 
               H1b: The second-tier agency conflict is expected to be stronger than the first-tier agency problem.  
 
 The moderating effect of CEO Power and CG structure on the PPS 
   
    As previously explained, although a limited number of studies have examined the direct effect of CG on 
the PPS (Core et al., 1999; Cornett et al., 2009; Sanchez et al., 2010; Conyon & He, 2011, 2012; Reddy et 
al., 2015; van Essen et al., 2015), studies examining the moderating (joint) effect of CG and especially 
CEO power on the PPS even within a developed corporate setting are rare (Li & Srinivasan, 2011; Wowak 
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et al., 2011). Thus, in this section, we seek to contribute to extant literature by briefly ascertaining whether 
CEO power and CG structure have a moderating effect on the PPS within a developing corporate context.    
 
The effect of CEO Power on the PPS 
 
      Prior studies have identified a number of CEO power attributes, including CEO age, duality, founding 
status, ownership, power, reputation and tenure, which can have important implications for CG, 
performance and the PPS (Conyon, 1997; Lippert and Porter, 1997; Benito & Conyon 1999; Lin, 2005; 
Sapp, 2008). We, therefore, focus on the effect of these seven (CEO age, duality, founding status, 
ownership, power, reputation and tenure) CEO power attributes on the PPS in the current study. From an 
MPH perspective, powerful CEOs, as represented by role duality and long-tenure, for example, may have 
greater control over the board and the pay-setting process, which can impact negatively on the PPS (Cornett 
et al., 2009). Theoretically, CEO role duality is considered detrimental because it vests more power and 
control in the CEO, which can generate extra agency problems, including granting CEOs greater freedom 
to engage in suboptimal pay practices (Conyon & He, 2011, 2012; Ntim, 2012b). In contrast, separating the 
two roles can improve monitoring by reducing the concentration of power in CEOs, which can facilitate an 
objective assessment of a CEO‟s performance (Conyon, 1997), and thereby improving the PPS. With 
respect to CEO reputation, Sanchez-Marin and Baixauli-Soler (2014) suggest that one of the results of 
increased public recognition and reputation (e.g., positions in peer rankings and wining of awards/prizes) of 
CEOs is that it facilitates non-performance induced increases in their pay packages, which can impact 
negatively on the PPS. Moreover, long-tenured and older CEOs are perceived to have greater experience 
and skill that can guarantee firm competitiveness and success (Sanchez et al., 2010), and are therefore, 
often offered higher pay packages that are not necessarily linked to their performance than their younger 
and less experienced colleagues, which can also impact negatively on the PPS. By contrast, increased 
commitment (OCT view) that is often displayed by founding, reputable and high shareholding CEOs can 
have a positive effect on the PPS (Wowak et al., 2011). Further, founding and shareholding CEOs, for 
instance, often offer a number of advantages, including possessing expert, in-depth and specific knowledge 
about corporate strategy and operations that reduces information asymmetry between boards and managers, 
holding concentrated and long-term ownership, and having large non-financial attachments and social 
interests to protect (e.g., emotional, psychological and reputational capital). Thus, the greater pecuniary and 
 10 
non-pecuniary interests that founding CEOs often have in their corporations can provide them with greater 
incentive and ability to engage in closer monitoring of managers, and thereby leading to improved PPS.  
The empirical literature is broadly consistent with the view that ensuring a balanced distribution of 
power at the top reduces the influence that CEOs may have over the pay setting processes and institutions, 
which can impact positively on the PPS (Lippert & Porter, 1997; Benito & Conyon 1999). For example, 
using 865 US listed firms from 2000 to 2005, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) report that the level of 
CEO pay is higher in firms with CEO role duality than those with separate chairman and CEO positions. 
Similar results have been reported by Conyon (1997), Core et al. (1999), Lin (2005) and Sapp (2008), for 
samples of UK, Taiwanese and Canadian listed firms, respectively. With reference to founding status, Li 
and Srinivasan (2011) report a higher PPS for firms with serving founder CEOs than those that are not. 
Similarly, Sanchez-Marin and Baixauli-Soler (2013) report higher PPS for firms with CEOs with high 
reputation for performance than those that are not.  In contrast, other studies report a lower PPS for firms 
with more powerful (e.g., having higher peer rankings), older and long-tenured CEOs (Bertrand & 
Mullainathan, 2001; Cornett et al., 2009; Wowak et al., 2011). With respect to SA, King II states explicitly 
that there should checks and balances such that too much power is not concentrated in one person, 
including the recommendation that the posts of chairman and CEO should not be held by the same 
individual in order to permit a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company. This suggests 
that King II recognises balance of power within top management as a good CG practice and, therefore our 
second hypothesis is that: 
H2: CEO power has a moderating effect on the PPS.  
 
 
The effect of ownership structure on the PPS 
 
       An important CG mechanism that can moderate the PPS is ownership structure of the firm (van Essen 
et al., 2015). The extent to which the board is able to effectively monitor executives will depend on the 
level of ownership concentration/distribution (e.g., block, director and institutional shareholdings) and the 
type of influence that may be exerted by these owners, especially major shareholders (Wowak et al., 2011; 
Sanchez-Marin & Baixauli-Soler, 2014). Consequently and in this study, we examine the extent to which 
these three ownership structures (block, director and institutional shareholdings) can have a moderating 
effect on the PPS. For example, greater monitoring that is often associated with block ownership can serve 
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as a substitute for a good incentive alignment mechanism that is able to effectively restrain executive pay 
and improve the PPS (Cheng & Firth, 2005; Ding et al., 2015; Ntim, 2013b), although concentrated 
ownership can also have costs implications for minority shareholders, including entrenchment and 
extraction of private benefits. Block shareholders can, for instance, connive with executives to engage in 
fraudulent activities, such as „tunnelling‟, or expropriate firm assets in the form of high pay at the expense 
of minority shareholders (Conyon & He, 2011, 2012), which can impact negatively on the PPS. This is 
more likely to be a problem in SA where corporate ownership has historically been dominated by a small 
set of very large companies often built around highly complicated cross-holdings and tall pyramid (Ntim et 
al., 2012a, b). Similarly and due to their larger shareholdings, institutional shareholders can exert greater 
influence on corporate decisions, including executive pay (Sapp, 2008). Institutional shareholders also 
enjoy knowledge and information advantages over individual or less-informed investors, which can 
facilitate greater activism and managerial monitoring that can impact positively on the PPS (Hartzell and 
Starks, 2003; Ding et al., 2015). Also, the alignment of interest that is often associated with director 
ownership can have a positive effect on the PPS (Morck et al., 1988; Li & Srinivasan, 2011; Ntim, 2012a).  
Empirically, the evidence is largely in line with the prediction that the presence of a large 
shareholder enhances managerial monitoring, reduces executive pay and improves the PPS (Kang & 
Shivdasani, 1995; Lin, 2005; Mehran, 1995; Ozkan, 2011). For example, Core et al. (1999) report that 
block ownership reduces the likelihood of CEO entrenchment, which impacts positively on the PPS for a 
sample of 205 US listed firms. Similarly, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), Sapp (2008), and Conyon and 
He (2011), respectively, report that US, Canadian and Chinese firms with greater block ownership pay their 
CEOs significantly less, compared to those with smaller block ownership. With respect to institutional 
ownership, Hartzell and Starks (2003), Sapp (2008), and Ozkan (2011), respectively, report that US, 
Canadian and UK companies with greater institutional ownership paid their CEOs significantly less than 
those with smaller institutional ownership. In contrast, the results of Zheng (2010) suggest that institutional 
ownership has no impact on CEO pay in a sample of US firms. However, and as previously discussed, King 
II urges institutional shareholders to play an active role in setting executive pay in SA firms, including 
being directly consulted for their views. A major implication of this is that institutional shareholders in SA 
can exert their influence on executive pay not only through voting, but also with a direct voice (i.e., have 
“say-on-pay”) on the RCOM/board. Further, Li and Srinivasan (2011) and Sanchez-Marin and Baixauli-
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Soler (2013) report that director ownership impacts positively on the PPS. Thus, and given the inherent 
pervasiveness of block, institutional and director shareholdings in SA (Ntim et al., 2012a, b), our third 
hypothesis is that: 
H3: Ownership structure has a moderating effect on the PPS. 
 
 
The effect of board structure (effectiveness) on the PPS 
 
      Corporate boards perform important functions, including monitoring, disciplining and compensating 
management to align their interests with those of shareholders (Beiner et al., 2006; Finkelstein et al., 2009), 
but their effectiveness is usually influenced by the way they are structured (e.g., size, composition, 
committees and meetings) (Cornett et al., 2009; Sanchez et al., 2010; Ntim, 2013a). Hence and in this 
study, we assess the moderating effect of these five board structures (board size, board meetings, proportion 
of NEDs, independent nomination committee, and independent remuneration committee) on the PPS. For 
instance, increased communication and coordination problems associated with larger boards limits their 
monitoring effectiveness, and this may be manifested in the form of excessive executive pay (Core et al., 
1999; Ozkan, 2011). By contrast, increased communication and coordination problems associated with 
larger boards limits their monitoring effectiveness, and this may be manifested in the form of excessive 
executive pay (Core et al., 1999; Ozkan, 2011). Further, as boards become smaller, their ability to hold 
frank discussions and engage in more effective managerial monitoring improves and, therefore, smaller 
boards can be expected to enhance the PPS. Similarly, non-executive directors (NEDs) have more 
incentives to effectively monitor CEO pay, not only because they are less subject to CEO influence, but 
also have reputations to protect in the labour market (Core et al., 1999; Conyon and He, 2011). Others 
suggest that executive pay decisions should be delegated to NEDs because they are better able to make 
unbiased judgments about the performance of the CEO and, in turn, decisions regarding firing, hiring and 
pay (Ozkan, 2011). Also, Cornett et al. (2009), and Ntim and Osei (2011) suggest that increased managerial 
monitoring associated with regular board meetings can impact positively on the PPS. Further, in most listed 
firms, the independent remuneration and nomination committees are the primary mechanism for monitoring 
and setting executive pay (Conyon, 1997; Bebchuk et al., 2002). Thus, their absence can exacerbate agency 
conflicts by giving CEOs more power to award themselves pay rises, which are not congruent with 
shareholder interests (Benito and Conyon, 1999; DeVaro & Fung, 2014). Thus, and in theory, establishing 
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these committees can improve the PPS by reducing the influence that CEOs have in setting their own pay. 
However, and to the extent that powerful CEOs can handpick members of the board and RCOM, their 
monitoring effectiveness will depend on the independence of the RCOM’s members from the CEO 
(Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2009). As director independence depends heavily on the nominating authority 
(Vefeas, 1999), in companies that do not have independent nomination committee (NCOM), whereby 
director selection is dominated by their CEOs, the effectiveness of the RCOM in setting optimal CEO pay 
may be seriously undermined (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Conyon & He, 2011, 2012). Therefore, the presence 
of an independent RCOM largely depends on the presence of an independent NCOM, and consequently, the 
ability of the RCOM to effectively monitor CEO pay.  
The empirical evidence largely suggests that effective board structures can have positive effect on 
the PPS (Cornett et al., 2009; Li & Srinivasan, 2011; Wowak et al., 2011; Sanchez et al., 2010). For 
example, Core et al. (1999), Sapp (2008), Ozkan (2011), and Conyon and He (2011), respectively, report 
that larger US, UK, Canadian and Chinese boards pay their CEOs higher than their smaller counterparts, 
and thus larger boards tend to have a negative effect on the PPS. The empirical evidence relating to NEDs 
is, however, mixed. Core et al. (1999), Li and Srinivasan (2011), Ozkan (2011), and Conyon and He 
(2011), respectively, report that US, UK and Chinese companies with more NEDs paid their CEOs more 
than those with smaller NEDs; leading to a lower PPS, while the findings of Cheng and Firth (2005), Lin 
(2005), and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) indicate that larger outside board representation leads to a 
reduction in the pay of Hong Kong, Taiwanese and US CEOs; resulting in a higher PPS, respectively. Other 
studies (Mehran, 1995; Fernandes, 2008; Sapp, 2008) report that the presence of NEDs has no impact on 
CEO pay and the PPS. Also, Cornett et al. (2009) report that the number of board meetings has a positive 
effect on the PSS. Finally, the empirical evidence is generally consistent with these theoretical predictions  
relating to the effect of nomination and remuneration committees on the PPS (Benito & Conyon 1999; Sun 
& Cahan, 2009). For example, and consistent with Vefeas (1999), Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) 
document a positive link between nomination committees and the quality of new director appointments in 
the US. Similarly, Conyon (1997), Sapp (2008) and Conyon and He (2011, 2012) find that the level of CEO 
pay is significantly lower and the PPS significantly higher in companies with independent remuneration 
committees. In the SA case, King II encourages boards to have a majority of NEDs, suggesting that 
increasing the number of NEDs is viewed as a positive CG development. Similarly, King II does not 
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specify the exact number of directors that should form a board, but sets out a general principle that every 
board must consider whether its size makes it effective, indicating that it considers board size as an 
important CG mechanism. Further, King II requires the RCOM and NCOM to be established, consisting of 
independent NEDs, and including the chairpersons. This suggests that King II considers the two committees 
as good governance mechanisms. Moreover, King II suggests that regular board meetings is a mark of 
conscientious board, and as such recommends that boards should meet as frequently as possible, at least 
four times in a year. Put together, it can be argued that King II expects these board structures (board size, 
meetings, NEDs, NCOM and RCOM) to impact on the PPS, and therefore our final hypothesis is that: 
H4: Board structure has a moderating effect on the PSS.                     
 
 
Research design 
 
Data considerations 
      As summarised in Table 2, due to capital structure and regulatory reasons, we excluded 111 financials 
and utilities from the total sample of 407, and thus our sample is drawn from all 291 non-financial firms 
listed on the JSE Ltd as at 31/12/2012. The data used in this study are derived from two separate sources. 
The first is the total executive pay and CG data extracted from company annual reports downloaded from 
the Perfect Information Database. Unlike most prior studies that have focused purely on CEO pay (Jensen 
& Murphy, 1990; Kale et al., 2014), we collect data on the total pay of both the CEO and all other 
executive directors, thereby permitting us to explicitly test both the primary and secondary agency 
problems. The second source of the financial data is DataStream. Firms included in our final sample met 
two criteria: availability of a firm‟s executive pay data for all years from 2003 to 2012 and the accessibility 
to a company‟s financial and CG data from 2002 to 2011, and thereby permitting us to estimate ex-ante 
PPS. These criteria were set for a number of reasons. First, the labour intensive nature of the manual 
collection of the executive pay and CG data introduced sample size limitations and, as such, we limited the 
sample to firms where consecutive year data were available. Second, and following previous studies (Core 
et al., 1999; Jimenez-Angueira & Stuart, 2015; Elghuweel et al., 2016; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Ntim et al., 
2016), our criteria ensured that the conditions for a balanced panel analysis were satisfied with its well 
documented advantages. Third, as suggested by Wowak et al. (2011) and Ntim (2016), examination of a 
10-year data with both cross-sectional and time series properties may be useful in ascertaining whether the 
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observed cross-sectional link between executive pay and performance is robust over time. Finally, the 
sample begins in 2002 because there is limited data coverage in the Perfect Information 
Database/DataStream on SA companies prior to that year, and crucially because King II came into effect in 
2002. The sample ends in 2012 because it is the most recent year for which data is available. As Table 2 
shows (after excluding 122 firms with no or some years data missing), the final sample consists of a total of 
169 firms over 10 firm-years (i.e., 1,690 observations) from eight industries that met the data criteria for 
our analysis.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Variables: Pay, performance, CEO/CG characteristics, interaction and control variables 
       We classify our variables into seven main types and full definitions of all the variables used are 
presented in Table 3. First, and following a well-established line of research (Murphy, 1985; Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990; Conyon & He, 2011), total pay of all executives (TPAY) and the CEO (CPAY) are our main 
dependent variables. Second, our main performance proxy is the widely used total share return (TSR), but 
as a robustness check, we also employ return on assets (ROA) and Tobin‟s Q (Q) as alternative accounting 
and market-based performance measures, respectively. The third group consists of CEO power proxies, 
including CEO age (CEOA), CEO duality (CEOD), CEO ownership (CEOO), CEO power (CEOP), CEO 
reputation (CEOR), CEO tenure (CEOT) and founding CEO (FCEO). The fourth group consists of board 
structure variables, including board size (BSIZ), percentage of independent non-executive directors (NEDs), 
number of board meetings (NBM) and the presence of independent remuneration (RCOM) and nomination 
(NCOM) committees, whilst the fifth group is made up ownership structure variables, including block 
ownership (BOWN), director ownership (DOWN) and institutional ownership (IOWN). Sixth, and to test for 
the moderating effect of CEO power/CG features on the PPS, we create an interaction variable between 
each of our monitoring CEO power/CG structure and performance (e.g., P*CEOA, P*BOWN, and P*BSIZ). 
Finally, and to attenuate potential omitted variables bias (Petersen, 2009), we include an extensive number 
of control variables (see Table 3).   
    Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Empirical analyses and discussion 
Descriptive statistics 
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      Table 4 contains descriptive statistics relating to the executive pay, performance, CEO, CG and control 
variables, and are reported in Groups A, B, C, D and E, respectively. The table suggests wide variation in 
the distribution of TPAY and CPAY values. CPAY, for example, ranges from a minimum of R0.06 million 
to a maximum of R16.86 million with a mean of R2.89 million. Noticeably, and despite King II‟s 
suggestion that equity-based pay should form a larger part of executives‟ pay in order to align their interests 
with those of shareholders, cash pay continue to form a substantial portion of total executive pay in SA. For 
instance, the average total equity-based pay of all executives (TPAY EQUITY) of R1.66 million is only 
about 13% of the average total pay (TPAY) of R12.92 million.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
       Similarly the values of the performance, CEO, CG and control variables generally indicate a wide 
spread. For example, and similar to the findings of Mehran (1995), TSR ranges from -48% to 236% with an 
average of 28%, indicating that most of the sampled firms are profitable. The median CEOA is 53, ranging 
from 34 to 81 years, whilst the average CEOT is 7, ranging from 3 months to 42 years. About 19% of our 
CEOs are founders, whilst about 23% doubles-up as CEOs and chairpersons. The average CEO is powerful 
(CEOP), with his/her pay accounting for 48% of all the other executives put together. These findings are 
roughly comparable with those reported by Cornett et al. (2009), Li and Srinivasan (2011) and Wowak et 
al. (2011) for US CEOs. The median BSIZ of 10 is lower than a corresponding number of 13 reported by 
Core et al. (1999) for a sample of US firms, while the average of 57% NEDs is in line with the 62% 
reported by Lee et al. (2008) for a sample of US companies. The mean IOWN of 74% is consistent with the 
63% reported by Zheng (2010) for a sample of US firms, whereas the average BOWN of 62% is 
considerably higher than the 20% reported by Ozkan (2011) for a sample of UK firms. Strikingly, only 
14% of our sampled firms have RCOM, far lower than the 66% reported by Brown and Caylor (2009) for a 
sample of US companies.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
Table 5 reports the correlation matrix for the variables to test for multicollinearity.  However, as a 
robustness check, we present both the Pearson‟s parametric and Spearman‟s non-parametric coefficients 
and, observably, the direction and magnitude of both coefficients are essentially the same and thus, 
indicating that any remaining non-normalities may not statistically harmful. Noticeably, apart from the 
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expected high correlation between TPAY and CPAY, the bivariate correlations among all the other variables 
are largely small and thus, suggesting that any remaining multicollinearities may not be statistically 
harmful. Observably, the TSR, CEOP, CEOR, CEOT, FCEO, BOWN and BSIZ are positively associated 
with TPAY, whilst DOWN, IOWN, NCOM, NEDs and RCOM are negatively related to TPAY. Additionally, 
there exist significant associations among the TPAY, CPAY, TSR, CEO, CG and the control variables used. 
 
Multivariate regression analyses 
Estimating the PPS 
       We conduct multiple regression analyses in order to test our hypotheses. Fixed-effects models have the 
advantage of capturing unobservable firm-level differences, such as firm complexity, managerial quality 
and corporate culture (Conyon & He, 2011). Following prior research (Wowak et al., 2011; Li & 
Srinivasan, 2011), we adopt a lagged structure with median (in order to account for the observable large 
pay differentials) fixed-effects to estimate ex-ante PPS using Jensen and Murphy (1990) style first 
difference approach. Thus, we begin our analyses with a basic fixed-effects model specified as follows: 
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where: TPAY is the main dependent variable; TSR is the main independent variable; CONTROLS refers to 
the control variables included  and δ refers to the firm-specific fixed-effects, consisting of a vector of the 
mean-differences of all time variant variables.      
Table 6 contains a fixed-effects regression of the PPS, with results reported for three models for both all 
executive directors‟ pay and CEO pay consisting of cash, non-cash and total as the dependent variables. 
First, the main aim of designing managerial incentives contracts is to align the interests of owners and 
managers. However, such contracts, could themselves, create primary agency problems, whereby powerful 
CEOs may use their influence to expropriate corporate resources. To investigate this first-tier agency 
conflict that exists between CEOs and shareholders, we examine the sensitivity of TSR to CPAY. The 
coefficient of TSR on CPAY in Model VI of Table 6 is positive and statistically significant. However, and 
consistent with prior studies the PPS is relatively small at 0.095, and thereby provides support for H1a that 
the PPS for CEOs is positive, but relatively small. For example, Conyon (1997) and Ozkan (2011), 
respectively, report share returns and CEO pay sensitivity of 0.061 and 0.095 for samples of UK firms. 
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Similarly, Hubbard and Palia (1995), Hartzell and Starks (2003), Cornett et al. (2009), and Li and 
Srinivasan (2011), respectively, report a PPS of 0.099, 0.093, 0.098 and 0.021 for samples of US firms. Our 
evidence also seems to provide support for the MPH, which suggests that in poorly-governed firms, 
powerful CEOs tend to use their influence to design suboptimal incentive contracts that facilitates rent 
extraction, leading to small PPS. 
Insert Table 6 about here. 
      Secondly, a second-tier agency conflict arises, whereby a suboptimal CEO pay package is approved by 
directors for a dominant CEO in return for some form of reciprocity from the CEO. To examine this 
secondary agency problem that occurs between directors and shareholders, we investigate the link between 
TPAY and TSR by replacing CPAY with TPAY in equation (1). The coefficient of TSR on TPAY in Model III 
of Table 6 is positive and statistically significant, but similarly small at 0.063, and thereby providing new 
support for H1b. The financial implication of this evidence is that directors tend to reward powerful CEOs 
with overly generous pay packages in exchange for favourable director incentive terms from the CEO 
(Core et al., 2003; Morse et al., 2011). This can result in a culture of reciprocity in extracting corporate 
resources at the expense of shareholders, and thereby equally leading to relatively small PPS. This conflict 
can particularly be exacerbated in SA where, under the King II proposals, the RCOM is required to seek the 
opinion of the CEO when deciding the pay of other executives. As a more direct and comparative test of the 
first- second-tier agency problems, we compare and test (see Table 7) the statistical significance of the 
estimated PPS coefficients between CEOs and all executive directors reported in Tables 6 and 8 to 13. As 
contained in Table 7, with the exception of the PPS coefficient reported in Panel D, step 1, the difference 
between CEOs and executives of all our estimates are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that 
the PPS for CEOs is almost always significantly higher than that of all executive directors. This offers 
additional support for H1b, as well as makes a new contribution to the literature by indicating that in a 
context of concentrated ownership and weak board structures; the second-tier (monitoring power and 
opportunism of other directors) agency conflict is stronger than the first-tier (CEO power and opportunism) 
agency problem.     
Insert Table 7 about here. 
       Third, our evidence so far suggests a positive, but relatively small PPS. Our total executive pay proxies 
are, however, made up of cash and equity-based pay. Therefore, to examine which component contributes 
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most to the PPS, we re-run equation (1) by iteratively replacing TPAY and CPAY with their cash and non-
cash alternatives, respectively. The respective coefficients of TSR on Cash and Non-cash-based pay in 
Models I and II for TPAY, as well as those in Models IV and V for the CPAY in Table 6 are all positive and 
statistically significant. Noticeably, and on average, the PPS appears stronger for equity-based than for 
cash-based pay. This provides support for the recommendations of King II and the findings of previous 
studies (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Main et al., 1996; Ozkan, 2011), which report a higher PPS for CEO non-
cash pay than CEO cash pay. The financial implication of this finding is that the structure rather than the 
level of pay appears to be more effective in influencing the PPS.   
       Fourth, and on comparative basis, the results in Table 6 also suggest that irrespective of the pay proxy 
used, the association between TSR and CPAY appears to be stronger than that between TSR and TPAY. This 
offers empirical support for the findings of Mehran (1995) and Sapp (2008) for samples of US and 
Canadian companies, respectively. One explanation is that CEOs perform larger and strategic roles with a 
higher possibility of being dismissed following poor performance than lower placed executives (Kang & 
Shivdasani, 1995; Dong, 2014; Guo et al., 2015), and consequently CEO pay is expected to be higher and 
more tied to performance to compensate for the associated extra responsibilities and risks.  
 
The moderating effect of CEO power and CG structure on the PPS 
 
       Our evidence so far suggests a positive, but relatively small PPS, which appears to provide support for 
the MPH. Central to the MPH, is the assumption that CEO commitment/CG is weak, which results in poor 
managerial monitoring and suboptimal incentive contracts. However, in better-governed firms with more 
committed CEOs, closer managerial monitoring can improve the PPS even if executive incentive contracts 
are somehow suboptimal. This suggests a complex modelling of the PPS, which takes into account the joint 
effect of both incentive alignment (executive pay) and monitoring (CEO power/CG structure) mechanisms 
on the PPS. Therefore, and in this sub-section, we distinctively investigate whether CEO power/CG 
structure can moderate the PPS with a fixed-effects regression model specified as follows:        
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where CG refers to the CEO power proxies, including CEOA, CEOD, CEOO, CEOP, CEOR, CEOT, 
FCEO and INT refers to their respective interaction variables, namely P*CEOA, P*CEOD, P*CEOO, 
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P*CEOP, P*CEOR, P*CEOT and P*FCEO. Everything else remains the same as defined in equation (1). 
We also re-estimate equation (2) by replacing the CEO power proxies with their CG counterparts. 
       Thus, Tables 8 and 9 contain fixed-effects regression results examining the moderating effect of CEO 
power and CG structure on the PPS, respectively. Models I to III in both tables report results relating to 
TPAY for the Q, ROA and TSR performance proxies, respectively, whilst Models IV to VI do similarly for 
the CPAY alternative. First, and consistent with the findings in Models III and VI in Table 6, the 
coefficients of the TSR on TPAY and CPAY in Models III and VI in both tables are, respectively, positive 
and statistically significant. However, and most importantly, it is clearly observable that, irrespective of the 
executive pay measure used, the PPSs have considerably improved. This implies that CEO power and CG 
qualities appear to significantly moderate the PPS, a result which also seem to provide support for the OCT. 
For example, the PPS between TSR and CPAY has increased from 0.095 in Model VI in Table 6 to 0.180 
(0.155) in Model VI of Table 8 (9). While these statistically significant differences (p-value <.01) are not 
substantially large compared to those reported by other studies (Buck et al., 2008; Conyon & He, 2011), it 
at least suggests that allowing for the existence of joint interactions among TPAY, CPAY, TSR, CEO power 
and CG mechanisms results in an improvement in the PPS. Also, and on comparative basis, it is apparent 
from Table 8 (9) that the increase in the PPS is higher for CPAY than for TPAY. This is again consistent 
with our previous explanation that emphasised the strategic nature of the CEO role. 
Insert Table 8 about here. 
Insert Table 9 about here 
      Second, and with specific reference to the interaction variables, the findings reported in Table 8(9) 
generally provide evidence of a moderating effect of CEO power (CG structure) on the PPS, which is 
largely consistent with the predictions of the OCT, as well as our hypotheses. Specifically, the coefficients 
of P*CEOC, P*CEOO, P*CEOR and P*FCEO on TPAY or CPAY in Models III and VI of Table 8 are 
statistically significant, providing support for H2. Similarly, the statistically significant and positive effect 
of P*BOWN and P*DOWN on TPAY or CPAY in Models III and VI of Table 9 provides support for H3, 
whereas the statistically significant effect of P*BSIZ, P*NCOM and P*RCOM on TPAY or CPAY in 
Models III and VI of Table 9 provides support for H4. Observably, our evidence contributes to a small, but 
gradually increasing number of international studies that suggest that board, CEO power and ownership 
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structures can have a moderating effect on the PPS (Cornett et al., 2009; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Li & 
Srinivasan, 2011; Wowak et al., 2011; Sanchez-Marin & Baixauli-Soler, 2014). 
        
Additional analyses 
 
       We conduct a number of additional analyses to further examine the robustness of our results. First, we 
check the robustness of our results by re-regressing equation (2) using Q and ROA as alternative 
performance proxies to the TSR. The results presented in Models I and II relating to TPAY based on the Q 
and ROA, respectively, and similarly in Models IV and V relating to CPAY in Tables 8 and 9 are 
qualitatively the same as those of the TSR in Models III and VI in the same tables, suggesting that our 
findings are robust to these alternative performance proxies.     
 Second, and so far we have estimated the PPS by taking into consideration the predictors, 
moderators and instruments simultaneously. One limitation of this approach is that it makes it difficult to 
assess the contributions of each category of variables. Therefore, and to ascertain the contributions of each 
category of variables to the estimated PPS, we employ a two-step multilevel
1
 (hierarchical) regression 
approach. Specifically, at the first step, we regress the instruments and predictors (governance and 
instrumented variables) on the compensation; and at the second step, we include the moderators 
(moderating variables) as additional explanatory variables. The results of our hierarchical (multilevel) 
regressions reported in Tables 10 and 11, respectively, for CEO power and CG structure suggest 
statistically significant and positive effect of PRE_TSR on TPAY and CPAY, respectively, thereby implying 
that our findings are fairly insensitive to estimating a hierarchical regression. However, the findings show 
that our moderating variables have some explanatory power, accounting roughly for between 8% and 12% 
(∆R2) of the variations in the estimated PPS. 
                                                               Insert Table 10 about here 
                                                               Insert Table 11 about here 
        Third, our sample period extends over the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. Thus, to ascertain whether 
executive pay differs over the period, we split the sample into two: pre- (2002 to 2006); and post- (2007 to 
2012) 2007 financial crisis periods, and re-estimate equation (1), by including an additional dummy 
variable (D_FINCRISIS), which takes the value of 1 if the financial year is post-2007 (2007 to 2012) and 0 
                                                 
1
We will like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.  
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if the financial year is pre-2007 (2002 to 2006).  Our full results, (which for brevity not reported here, but 
available on request), suggest a significant and positive coefficient (0.16) on the D_FINCRISIS. The 
economic interpretation of this evidence is that executive pay has increased in the pre-2007 period by about 
16% (8%) in nominal (real – adjusted for 5% SA annual inflation rate) terms.   
Insert Table 12 about here. 
Insert Table 13 about here 
       Finally, and to address causality and/or endogeneity problems that may be caused by potential omitted 
variables bias, we use the widely applied two-stage least squares (2SLS) methodology. However, to make 
sure that the 2SLS technique is appropriate, and following past studies (Beiner et al., 2006; Larcker & 
Rusticus, 2010), we first conduct the Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test to test for the existence of an 
endogenous association between TSR and TPAY or CPAY. The null hypothesis of no endogeneity is rejected 
at the 1% level when the test is applied to equation (2), and we therefore, conclude that the 2SLS technique 
is appropriate and that our fixed-effects results may be misleading and as such, requiring further 
investigation that follows. 
        The findings of several past studies (Beiner et al., 2006; Brown and Caylor, 2009) suggest that tge 
CEO power and CG structure variables do affect performance, and as such, in the first-stage, we assume 
that TSR will be determined by 7 CEO power and 8 CG structure mechanisms, as well as the 10 control 
variables. Therefore, the first-stage model to be estimated is specified as:                                        
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       Consistent with our predictions, the results, (which for brevity are not fully reported here, but available 
upon request), suggest statistically significant effect of the CEO power, CG structure and control variables 
on the TSR. Therefore, we re-regress equation (2) specified as: 
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where everything remains the same as defined in equation (2) except that we use the predicted TSR 
(PRE_TSR) from equation (3) as instrument for TSR. The 2SLS results reported in Models III and VI of 
Tables 12 and 13, respectively, for CEO power and CG structure suggest statistically significant and 
positive effect of PRE_TSR on TPAY and CPAY, respectively, thereby implying that our findings are fairly 
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robust to potential causality and/or endogeneity problems that may arise from omitted variables. 
Additionally, the 2SLS results based on Q and ROA performance alternatives contained in Tables 12 and 13 
remain positive and statistically significant, suggesting further that our findings are not significantly 
sensitive to potential causality and/or endogeneity problems.    
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
This study examines the crucial question of whether chief executive officer (CEO) power and 
governance (CG) mechanisms can moderate the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) using a sample of 
169 South African (SA) listed firms from 2002 to 2012. This coincides with a period during which the SA 
authorities introduced CG reforms that incorporated the expectation that executive pay will be strongly 
linked to performance. This permits us to distinctively examine the joint effects of incentive alignment 
(pay) and monitoring (CEO power and CG structure) mechanisms on the PPS using data on both total cash 
and equity-based CEO pay, as well as that of all executive directors. Our study, therefore, extends, as well 
as makes a number of new contributions to the extant theoretical and empirical literature.  
First, previous studies examining direct links between executive pay and performance have generally 
reported a positive, but relatively small PPS (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Murphy, 1999; Tosi et al., 
2000; van Essen et al., 2015). This appears to provide support for the managerial power hypothesis (MPH), 
which suggests that powerful executives use their influence to extract excessive rent through suboptimal 
incentive contracts. However, optimal contracting theory (OCT) predicts that in firms with strong 
governance and committed CEOs, greater monitoring can still improve the PPS even if executive incentive 
contracts are somehow suboptimal (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001; Kuo et al., 2014). Prior studies, 
however, have seldom investigated the joint effects of incentive alignment and monitoring mechanisms on 
the PPS (Cornett et al., 2009; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Li & Srinivasan, 2011; Wowak et al., 2011). In 
contrast, this paper distinctively investigates the more complex questions of why and how CEO and CG 
qualities can possibly moderate the PPS. Consistent with our predictions, the findings contribute to the 
literature by evidencing a positive, but relatively small PPS, and thereby providing support for the MPH. 
However, and in line with the predictions of the OCT, we also find that the PPS improves in firms with 
committed CEOs and strong governance. Specifically, we find that the PPS is higher in firms with more 
reputable, founding and shareholding CEOs, higher ownership by directors and institutions, and 
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independent nomination and remuneration committees, but lower in firms with larger boards, more 
powerful, and long tenured CEOs. 
Second, within the MPH, two distinct agency conflicts emerge when designing executive incentive 
contracts: primary and secondary (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Dong, 2014). The first-tier agency problem relates 
to the power that a CEO may have over the board in setting its own pay, which can facilitate excessive rent 
skimming through a suboptimal CEO incentive contract (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). The secondary agency 
problem concerns the apparent conflict of interests faced by directors in deciding both their own pay and 
that of the CEO, which can create a culture of mutual-favour, whereby an overly generous CEO incentive 
contract is approved by the board in return for favourable pay packages for the directors, and thereby 
equally leading to excessive rent extraction (Morse et al., 2011; Ding et al., 2015). Whilst the primary 
agency conflict has been extensively examined (Murphy, 1999; Frydman & Jenter, 2010), the impact of the 
second-tier agency conflict on the PPS has rarely been investigated (Core et al., 2003). Our findings 
contribute to the literature by showing that the PPS for both the CEO and all executive directors is 
generally small, but comparatively strong in firms with committed CEOs and strong governance. In 
particular, our results make a new contribution to the literature by showing that in a context of concentrated 
ownership and weak board structures; the first-tier agency conflict (CEO power and self-serving) is weaker 
than the second-tier agency problem (monitoring by other executive directors and self-interest). 
Apart from our new empirical contributions, our findings also offer new insights and extensions to the 
OCT and MPH theories. Prior studies have often presented these two theories as competitors and as such, 
simply tested them in isolation; thereby failing to appreciate and identify their interconnectedness. Our 
findings show that whilst suboptimal pay contracts can result from powerful CEOs dominating pay setting 
institutions (e.g., the board and remuneration committee) and processes (as suggested by MPH), such 
agency conflicts can be reduced by contemporaneously strengthening CG structures (as suggested by 
OCT), and thereby equally leading to improved PPS. Methodologically, our findings imply that future 
researchers will need to commit to a more complex and dynamic instead of the traditional simple modelling 
of the PPS that is able to simultaneously incorporate both incentive alignment (pay) and monitoring (CG) 
mechanisms if their evidence is to be robust.      
       Third, our findings also have important policy, practitioner, regulatory and broader societal 
implications, especially for companies and authorities in other developing countries that are contemplating 
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or currently pursuing CG and executive pay policy reforms. A key implication of our evidence is that for 
greater effectiveness, incentive alignment (executive pay) and monitoring (CG) policy reforms should be 
jointly pursued. For example, in order to obtain maximum impact, a recommendation for equity-based pay 
to constitute a substantial portion of total executive pay in order to align executive interests with those of 
shareholders should be accompanied by equivalent CG reforms that seek to: (i) strengthen board 
independence by encouraging relatively smaller boards that are supported by properly constituted and 
functioning independent sub-committees, such as nomination and remuneration committees; (ii) promote 
greater institutional shareholding and activism; and (iii) stimulate ownership by directors. Additionally, our 
evidence implies that efforts by policy-makers, practitioners, regulators and broader society at improving 
good governance in general, and the PPS in particular, should not only focus on reducing concentration of 
power (e.g., discouraging entrenchment through long tenure) and increasing financial interests (e.g., 
encouraging ownership) among CEOs/senior executives, but also encouraging strong non-
financial/emotional (e.g., founder status and public reputation for good governance/performance) 
attachments to their firms. Methodologically, our evidence implies that scholars seeking to robustly model 
the PPS, should not only consider traditional measures (e.g., performance and size), but also non-traditional 
factors (e.g., CEO power, board and ownership structures) within a joint estimation framework. 
Finally, whilst our evidence is important and robust, some caveats are deemed appropriate. Due to 
data limitations, the analysis is restricted to a limited number of internal CG mechanisms and, as data 
coverage improves, future studies may need to consider external CG mechanisms, such as data on the 
market for corporate control, in estimating the PPS.  Like all archival studies of this nature, our variables 
employed as measures for performance, CEO power and CG structures may or may not represent how 
boards, executives and shareholders operate in practice.  For example, past studies have shown that it is the 
role (e.g., active or passive) rather than the extent of institutional ownership per se that can impact 
positively on governance and pay structures (Gillan & Starks, 2003; Hartzell & Starks, 2003; Almazan et 
al., 2005). However, due to data limitations, we have not been able to divide our institutional ownership 
measure into active, passive, long-term and short-term investors and thus, future studies may improve on 
our findings by investigating their effect on the PPS. As we focus only on SA, generalisability of our 
findings are arguably limited and hence, future studies may be able to offer new insights by applying our 
framework to a cross-country data, especially from developing countries in Africa, America, Asia and 
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Europe.  Methodologically, more nuanced insights may be gained by future scholars by conducting in-
depth interviews with boards, executives and owners relating to CG, pay and the PPS.  
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Al-Bassam, W.M. and Ntim, C.G. (2016). The Effect of Islamic values on voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure: The case of Saudi listed firms. Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research. 
Forthcoming. 
Al-Bassam, W.M., Ntim, C.G., Opong, K.K., & Downs, Y. (2016). Corporate boards and ownership 
structure as antecedents of corporate governance disclosure in Saudi Arabian publicly listed corporations. 
Business & Society, Forthcoming. 
Alman, A., Hartzell, J.C., & Starks, L.T. (2005). Active institutional shareholders and costs of monitoring: 
Evidence from executive compensation. Financial Management, 34(4), 5-34. 
Angel, P.O., & Fumas, V.S. (1997). The compensation of Spanish executives: A test of a managerial talent 
model, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15(4), 511-531. 
Armstrong, Philip, Segal, Nick, & Davis, B. (2006) Corporate governance in South Africa. In: C.A. Mallin 
(Eds) Handbook on international corporate governance, pp.210-231 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing). 
Balafas, N., & Florackis, C. (2014). CEO compensation and future shareholder returns: Evidence from the 
London Stock Exchange. Journal of Empirical Finance, 27, 97-115.  
Bebchuk L.A., & Fried, J.M. (2004). Pay without performance, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). 
Bebchuk L.A., & Grinstein, Y. (2005). The growth of executive pay. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
21(2), 283-303. 
Bebchuk L.A., & Weisbach, M.S. (2010). The state of corporate governance research. Review of Financial 
Studies, 23(2), 939-961. 
Bebchuk, L.A., & Fried, J.M. (2003). Executive compensation as an agency problem. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 17(3), 71-92. 
Bechuk, L.A., Fried, J.M., & Walker, D.I. 2002. Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of 
executive compensation. University of Chicago Law Review, 69, 751-846. 
Beiner, S., Drobetz, W., Schmid, M.M., & Zimmermann, H. (2006). An integrated framework of corporate 
governance and firm valuation. European Financial Management, 12(2), 249-283. 
Benito, A., & Conyon, M.J. (1999). The governance of directors‟ pay: Evidence from UK companies. 
Journal of Management & Governance, 3(2), 117-136. 
Berrone, P., Makri, M., & Gomez-Mejia, L.R. (2008). Executive compensation in North American high-
technology firms: A contextual approach. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 19, 
1534-1552.  
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2001). Are CEOS rewarded for luck? The ones without principals are. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3), 901-932. 
Blanco, M.R. & Golik, M.N. (2015). Born under a lucky star? Latin American CEOs‟ perceptions about 
their own career development. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 26(14), 1865-
1888. 
Bloom, M., Milkovich, G.T., & Mitra, A. (2003). International compensation: Learning from how 
managers respond to variations in local host contexts. International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 14(8), 1350-1367. 
Bonache, J. & Fernandez, Z. (1997). Expatriate compensation and its link to the subsidiary strategic role: A 
theoretical analysis. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 8(4), 457-475. 
Brown, L.D., & Caylor, M.L. (2009). Corporate governance and firm operating performance. Review of 
Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 32(2), 129-144. 
Buck, Trevor, Liu, Xiaohui, & Skovoroda, R. (2008). Top executive pay and firm performance in China, 
Journal of International Business Studies, 39, 833-850. 
Chahine, S., & Goergen, M. (2011). The two sides of the CEO option grants at the IPO. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 17, 1116–1131. 
 27 
Chen, J., Ezzamel, M., & Cai, Z. (2011). Managerial power theory, tournament theory, and executive pay 
in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(4), 1176-1199. 
Cheng, S., & Firth, M. (2005). Ownership, corporate governance and top management pay in Hong Kong. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(2), 291-302. 
Chhaochharia, V., & Grinstein, Y. (2009). CEO compensation and board structure. Journal of Finance, 
64(1), 231-261. 
Cho, K.R., Huang, C.-H., & Padmanabhan, P. (2014). Foreign ownership mode, executive compensation 
structure, and corporate governance: Has the literature missed an important link? Evidence from 
Taiwanese firms. International Business Review, 23(2), 371-380. 
Claessens, S.B. & Yurtoglu, B. (2013). Corporate governance in emerging markets: A survey. Emerging 
Markets Review, 15, 1-33.  
Conyon, M.J. (1997). Corporate governance and executive compensation. International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 15(4), 493-509. 
Conyon, M.J., & He, L. (2011). Executive compensation and corporate governance in China. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 17(4), 1158-1175. 
Conyon, M.J., & He, L. (2012). CEO compensation and corporate governance in China. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 20(6), 575-592. 
Conyon, M.J., & Murphy, K.J. (2000). The prince and the pauper? CEO pay in the United States and 
United Kingdom. Economic Journal, 110(467), 640-671. 
Core, J.E., Guay, W.R., Larcker, D.F. (2003). Executive equity compensation: A survey. Economic Policy 
Review, 9(1), 7-50. 
Core, J.E., Holthausen, R.W., & Larcker, D.F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer 
compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), 371-406. 
Cornett, M.M., McNutt, J.J., & Tehranian, H. (2009). Coporate governance and earnings management at 
large U.S. bank holding companies. Journal of Corporate Finance, 15, 412-430.  
DeVaro, J., & Fung, S. (2014). Public bailouts, executive compensation and retention: A structural analysis. 
Journal of Empirical Finance, 26, 131-149. 
Dharwadkar, B., George, G., & Brandes, P. (2000). Privatization in emerging economies: An agency theory 
perspective. Academy of Management Review, 25, 650-669.  
Ding, D.Z, Akhtar, S., & Ge, G.L. (2006). Organizational differences in managerial compensation and 
benefits in Chinese firms. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 17(4), 693-715. 
Ding, S., Jia, C., Wilson, C., & Wu, Z. (2015). Political connections and agency conflicts: The roles of 
owner and manager political influence on executive compensation. Review of Quantitative Finance and 
Accounting, 45, 407-434. 
Ding, S., Jia, C., Wu, Z., & Zhang, X. (2014). Executive political connections and firm performance: 
Comparative evidence from privately-controlled and state-owned enterprises. International Review of 
Financial Analysis, 36, 153-167. 
Dong, G.N. (2014). Excessive financial services CEO pay and financial crisis: Evidence from calibration 
estimation. Journal of Empirical Finance, 27, 75-96. 
Dong, M., & Ozkan, A. (2008). Institutional investors and director pay: An empirical study of UK 
companies. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 18(1), 16-29. 
Dong, Z., Wang, C., & Xie, F. (2010). Do executive stock options induce excessive risk taking? Journal of 
Banking Finance, 34(10), 2518-2529. 
Elghuweel, M.I., Ntim, C.G., Opong, K.K., & Avison, L. (2016). Corporate governance, Islamic 
governance and earnings management in Oman: New empirical insights from behavioural theoretical 
perspective. Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, Forthcoming. 
Elmagrhi, M.H., Ntim, C.G., & Wang, Y. (2016). Antecedents of voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure: A post-2007/08 financial crisis evidence from the influential UK Combined Code. Corporate 
Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 16(3), 507-538. 
Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D.C., & Cannella, A. A. (2009). Strategic leadership: Theory and research on 
executives, top management teams, and boards. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Firth M., Fung, P.M.Y., & Rui, O.M. (2007). How ownership and corporate governance influence chief 
executive pay in China‟s listed firms. Journal of Business Research, 60(7), 776-785. 
Firth, M., Fung, P.M.Y., & Rui, O.M. (2006). Corporate performance and CEO compensation. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 12(4), 693-714. 
Frydman, C., & Jenter, D, (2010). CEO compensation. Annual Review of Financial Economics, 2(1), 75-
102. 
 28 
Frydman, C., & Saks, R.E. (2010). Executive compensation: A new view from long-run perspective, 
Review of Financial Studies, 23(5), 2099-2138. 
Gil-Alana, L.A., Iniguez-Sanchez, R., & Lopez-Espinosa, G. (2011). Endogenous problems in cross-
sectional valuation models based on accounting information. Review of Quantitative Finance and 
Accounting, 37(2), 245-265.   
Gillan, S., & Starks, L. (2003). Corporate governance, corporate ownership, and the role of institutional 
investors: A global perspective. Journal of Applied Finance, 13(2), 4-22. 
Goergen, M., & Renneboog, L. (2011). Managerial compensation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(4), 
1068-1077. 
Gomez-Mejia, L.R., Tosi, H., & Hinkin, T. (1987). Managerial control, performance and executive 
compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 30(1), 51-70. 
Gomez-Mejia, L.R., & Wiseman, R.M. (1997). Reframing executive compensation: An assessment and 
outlook. Journal of Management, 23, 291-374. 
Guo, L, Jalal, A., & Khaksari, S. (2015). Bank executive compensation structure, risk taking and the 
financial crisis. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Forthcoming. 
Hartzell, J.C., & Starks, L.T. (2003). Institutional investors and executive compensation. Journal of 
Finance, 58(6), 2351-2374. 
He, L., Wan, H., & Zhou, X. (2014). How are political connections valued in China? Evidence from market 
reaction to CEO succession. International Review of Financial Analysis, 36, 141-152. 
Hubbard, G.R., & Palia, D. (1995). Executive pay and performance: Evidence from the US banking 
industry. Journal of Financial Economics, 39(1), 105-130. 
Jensen, M.C., & Meckling, W.H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 12(4), 235-360. 
Jensen, M.C., Murphy, K.J. (1990). Performance pay and top-Management incentives. Journal Political 
Economy, 98(2), 225-264. 
Jimenez-Angueira, C.E., & Stuart, N.V. (2015). Relative performance evaluation, pay-for-luck, and double-
dripping in CEO compensation. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 44, 701-732. 
Jones, D., & Kato, T. (1996). The determinants of chief executive compensation in transitional economies: 
Evidence from Bulgaria. Labour Economics, 3(3), 305-360. 
Jones, R.A., & Wu, Y.W. (2010). Executive compensation, earnings management and shareholder 
litigation, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 35(1), 1-20. 
Kale, J.R., Reis, E., & Venkateswaran, A. (2014). Pay inequalities and managerial turnover. Journal of 
Empirical Finance, 27, 21-29. 
Kang, J-K., & Shivdasani, A. (1995). Firm performance, corporate governance, and top executive turnover 
in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics, 38, 29-58. 
Kaplan, S. (1994). Top executives, turnover and firm performance in Germany. Journal of Law, Economics 
and Organization, 10(1), 142-159. 
Kato, T.K., & Long, C.X. (2006). Executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in 
China: Evidence from listed firms in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 54, 945-983.  
King Committee (1994, 2002, 2010). King reports on corporate governance for South Africa, 
(Johannesburg: Institute of Directors). 
Kumar, V.A., & Kaura, M.H. (2002). Executive compensation and corporate performance: An EVA 
approach, South Asian Journal of Management, 9, 12-20.  
Kuo, H.-C., Lin, D., Lin, D., Wang, L.-H., & Yeh, L.-J. (2014). Is there an inverse U-shaped relationship 
between pay and performance? North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 28, 347-357. 
La Porta, R.,  López-de-Silanes, F.,  & Shleifer, A., (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. Journal 
of Finance, 54(2), 471-517. 
La Porta, R.,  López-de-Silanes, F.,  & Shleifer, A., (2002). Investor protection and corporate valuation. 
Journal of Finance, 57(3), 1147-1170. 
La Porta, R., López-de- Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R., (2000). Investor protection and corporate 
governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2), 3-27. 
Larcker, D.F., & Rusticus, T.O. (2010). On the use of instrumental variables in accounting research. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 49(3), 186-205. 
Lee, K.W., Lev, B., & Yeo, G.H.H. (2008). Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance, and firm 
performance. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 30(3), 315-338. 
 29 
Lee, M.B., Scarpello, V., & Rockmore, B.W. (1995). Strategic compensation in South Korea‟s publicly 
traded firms. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 6(3), 686-701. 
Li, F., & Srinivasan, S. (2011). Corporate governance when founders are directors. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 102, 454-469.  
Lin, Y-F. (2005). Corporate governance, leadership structure and CEO compensation: Evidence from 
Taiwan. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(6), 824-835. 
Lippert, R., & Porter, G. (1997). Understanding CEO pay: A test of two pay-to-performance sensitivity 
measures with alternative measures of alignment and influence. Journal of Business Research, 40(2), 
127-138. 
Main, B.G.M., Bruce A., & Buck, T. (1996). Total board remuneration and company performance. 
Economic Journal, 106(439), 1627-1644. 
Malherbe, S., & Segal, N. (2003). South Africa: after apartheid, in: C. P. Oman (Eds), Corporate 
governance in development, the experiences of Brazil, Chile, India, and South Africa, pp.248-251 
(Washington: OECD). 
McKnight, P.J., & Tomkins, C. (1999). Top executive pay in the United Kingdom: A corporate governance 
dilemma. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 6(2), 223-243. 
Mehran, H. (1995). Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 38(2), 163-184. 
Merhebi, R., Pattenden, K., Swan, P.L., & Zhou, X. (2006). Australian chief executive officer 
remuneration: pay and performance, Accounting and Finance, 46(3), 481-497. 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W. (1988). Management ownership and market valuation: An 
empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293-315. 
Morse, A., Nanda, V., & Seru, A. (2011). Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? Journal 
Finance, 66(5), 1779-1821. 
Murphy, K.J. (1985). Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical investigation, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1-3), 11-42. 
Murphy, K.J. (1999). Executive compensation. In: O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (Eds) Handbook of labor 
economics, pp.2485-2563 (Amsterdam: North-Holland). 
Ntim, C.G. (2016). Corporate governance, corporate health accounting and firm value: The case of 
HIV/AIDS disclosures in Sub-Saharan Africa. International Journal of Accounting, 51(2), 155-216.  
Ntim, C.G., Soobaroyen, T., & Broad, M.J. (2016). Governance structures, voluntary disclosures and public 
accountability: The case of UK higher education institutions. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal, Forthcoming. 
Ntim, C.G, Opong, K.K., & Danbolt, J. (2012a). The relative value relevance of shareholder versus 
stakeholder corporate governance disclosure policy reforms in South Africa. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 20(1): 84-105. 
Ntim, C.G., Lindop, S., & Thomas, D.A. (2013). Corporate governance and risk reporting in South Africa: 
A study of corporate risk disclosures in the pre- and post-2007/2008 global financial crisis periods. 
International Review of Financial Analaysis. 30, 363-383. 
Ntim, C.G., Opong, K.K., & Danbolt, J. (2015a). Board size, corporate regulations and firm valuation in an 
emerging market: A simultaneous equation approach. International Review of Applied Economics, 29(2), 
194-220. 
Ntim, C.G., Lindop, S., Osei, K.A., & Thomas, D.A. (2015b). Executive compensation, corporate 
governance and corporate performance: A simultaneous equation approach. Managerial and Decision 
Economics, 36, 67-96. 
Ntim, C.G., Opong, K.K., Danbolt, J., & Thomas, D.A. (2012b). Voluntary corporate governance 
disclosures by post-apartheid South African corporations. Journal of Applied Accounting Research, 
13(2), 122-144. 
Ntim, C.G. (2013a). Monitoring board committee structure and market valuation in large publicly listed 
South African corporations. International Journal of Managerial and Financial Accounting, 5(3), 310-
325.  
Ntim, C.G. (2013b). Corporate ownership and market valuation in South Africa: Uncovering the effects of 
shareholdings by different groups of corporate insiders and outsiders. International Journal of Business 
Governance and Ethics, 8(3), 242-264. 
Ntim, C.G. (2012a). „Director Shareownership and Corporate Performance in South Africa‟, African 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 1(4), 359-373.  
 30 
Ntim, C.G. (2012b). Does the South African stock market values independent board dual leadership 
structure? Economics and Business Letters, 1(1), 35-45. 
Ntim, C.G. (2011). The King Reports, independent non-executive directors and firm valuation on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Corporate Ownership and Control, 9(1), 428-440.  
Ntim, C.G. & Osei, K.A. (2011). The impact of corporate board meetings on corporate performance in 
South Africa. African Review of Economics and Finance, 2(2), 83-103. 
Ozkan, N. (2011). CEO compensation and firm performance: An empirical investigation of UK panel data, 
European Financial Management, 17(2), 260-285. 
Peng, M.W., Wang, D.Y.L., & Jiang, Y. (2008). An institution-based view of international business 
strategy: A focus on emerging economies. Journal of International Business Studies, 39, 920-936. 
Pepper, A., Gore, J., & Crossman, A. (2013). Are long-term incentive plans an effective and efficient way 
of motivating senior executives? Human Resource Management Journal, 23(1), 36-51. 
Petersen, M.A. (2009). Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing approaches. 
Review of Financial Studies, 22(1), 435-480. 
Reddy, K., Abidin, S., & You, L. (2015). Does corporate governance matter in determining CEO 
compensation in the publicly listed companies in New Zealand? An empirical investigation. Managerial 
Finance, 41(3), 301-327. 
Romero, M.G. & Cabrera, R.V. (2001). Strategy and managers‟ compensation: The Spanish case. 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 12(2), 218-242. 
Sanchez-Marin, G. & Baixauli-Soler, J.S. (2014). CEO reputation and top management team compensation. 
Management Decision, 52(3), 540-558. 
Sanchez-Marin, G., Baixauli-Soler, J.S., & Lucas-Perez, M.E. (2010). When much is not better? Top 
management compensation, board structure, and performance in Spanish firms. International Journal of 
Human Resource Management, 21(15), 2778-2797. 
Sapp, S.G. (2008). The impact of corporate governance on executive compensation. European Financial 
Management, 14(4), 710-746. 
Sarra J.P. (2004). Strengthening domestic corporate activity in global capital markets: A Canadian 
perspective on South Africa‟s corporate governance. GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 
118, University of British Columbia, Vancouver. 
Schaefer, S. (1998). The dependence of pay-performance sensitivity on the size of the firm. Review of 
Economic Statistics, 80(3), 436-443. 
Sun, J., & Cahan, S. (2009). The effect of compensation committee quality on the association between CEO 
cash compensation and accounting performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(2), 
193-207. 
Tien, C. & Chen, C.-.N. (2012). Myth or reality? Assessing the moderating role of CEO compensation on 
the momentum of innovation in R&D. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 23(13) 
2763-2784. 
Tosi, H.L., Werner, S., Katz, J.P., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2000). How much does performance matter? A 
meta-analysis of CEO pay studies. Journal of Management, 26, 301-339.  
Upneja, A., & Ozdemir, O. (2014). Compensation practices in the lodging industry: Does top management 
pay affect corporate performance? International Journal of Hospitality Management, 30, 30-38. 
van Essen, Otten, J., & Carberry, E.J. (2015). Assessing managerial power theory: A meta-analytic 
approach to understanding the determinants of CEO Compensation. Journal of Management, 41, 164-
202. 
Vefeas, N. (1999). The nature of board nominating committees and their role in corporate governance. 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 26(1-2), 199-225. 
Wowak, A.J., Hambrick, D.C., & Henderson, A.D. (2011). Do CEOs encounter within-tenure settling up? 
A multiperiod perspective on executive pay and dismissal. Academy of Management Journal, 54, 719-
739.  
Young, M.N., Peng, M.W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G.D., & Jiang, Y. (2008). Corporate governance in 
emerging economies: A review of the principal–principal perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 
45, 196-220. 
Zheng, Y. (2010). Heterogenous institutional investors and CEO compensation. Review of Quantitative 
Finance and Accounting, 35(1), 21-46. 
 
 
 
 31 
Table 1. A summary of director remuneration policy reforms contained in the King I and II reports 
Remuneration provision 1994 King Report (King I) 2002 King Report (King II) 
Philosophy of remuneration: 
     Remuneration policy 
            Rationale/basis  
 
Not specified 
      Not specified 
 
Required to be stated 
       Required to be stated 
Remuneration committee: 
     Committee 
            Composition 
     Chairperson 
            Charter/terms of reference 
     Performance evaluation 
 
Required to be established 
      Not specified 
Not specified 
      Not specified 
Not specified 
 
Required to be established 
      Only independent directors 
Independent director 
       Required to be stated 
On an annual basis 
Nomination committee: 
     Committee 
            Composition 
     Chairperson 
            Charter/terms of reference 
     Performance evaluation 
 
Not specified 
      Not specified 
Not specified 
      Not specified 
Not specified 
 
Required to be established 
     Majority independent dtors. 
Independent director 
       Required to be stated 
On an annual basis 
Remuneration structure: 
     Cash-based 
           Equity-based 
     Proportion 
 
Not specified 
      Not specified 
Not specified 
 
Required to be specified 
      Required to be specified 
Equity-based should be greater 
Remuneration approval: 
    Remuneration committee 
           Board 
     Shareholders/AGM 
 
Recommend remuneration level 
       Required to approve 
Not specified 
 
Recommend remuneration level 
       Required to approve 
Has final approving authority 
Shareholder activism: 
     Encouragement 
           Questioning 
     Shareholder consultation 
 
Not specified 
       Not specified 
Not specified 
 
Explicitly encouraged 
      Questions to the chair 
Major institutional shareholders 
Remuneration disclosure: 
    Executive/CEO 
           Non-executive 
    Independent 
           Frequency 
   Medium 
         Details/items 
   Committee membership 
           Meetings/attendance 
 
Not specified 
       Note specified 
Not specified 
       Not specified 
Not specified 
       Not specified 
Not specified 
       Not specified 
 
On an individual basis 
       On an individual basis 
On an individual basis 
        On an annual basis 
Annual report 
         All: cash and equity-based 
On an individual basis 
         On an individual basis 
Compliance or regulation  Voluntary or self-regulation Voluntary or self-regulation 
Notes: Compiled from the 1994 (King I) and 2002 (King II) South African Corporate Governance Reports. It should also be noted that 
King II was revised and replaced with King III in March 2010, albeit with limited implications for CG and executive remuneration. 
The main difference between the two is that integrated sustainability reporting has been made mandatory (including distinctively 
requiring the sustainability report to be externally/independently audited) in King III instead being voluntary in King II.   
 32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of sampling procedure 
Industrial composition of the total non-financial firms listed   No. in each      Percentage 
on the JSE available to be sampled as at 31/12/2012        industry        of sample  
Industrials              81   27.8 
Basic materials                     67   23.0 
Consumer services              62   21.3  
Consumer goods                      36   12.4  
Technology               31   10.7  
Health care                 7     2.4        
Telecommunications                4     1.4  
Oil and gas                 3     1.0 
Total firms available to be sampled                        291                    100.0 
       Less:  Firms with no year‟s data available                              28     
               Firms with some years‟ data missing                           94       122   41.9  
Total sampled firms with full data included in study                      169   58.1 
Industrial composition of                                No. in each         Percentage  
sampled firms with full data                      industry          of sample  
Industrials               51   30.2 
Consumer services             35   20.7 
Basic materials                      33   19.5  
Consumer goods                           24   14.2  
Technology               19   11.2  
Health care                3     1.8        
Telecommunications                3     1.8  
Oil and gas                1     0.6 
Total sampled firms with full data included in study                     169                            100.0 
Source: JSE Ltd.  
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Table 3. Summary of variables 
Total executive pay (dependent) variables 
CPAY Natural log of cash (base salary, performance bonus, pension contribution and others) and 
non-cash/equity (granted shares, exercised options and any other long-term incentive 
plans) based pay of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO).   
TPAY Natural log of total cash (salary, bonus, pension contribution and others) and non-
cash/equity (granted shares, exercised options and any other long term incentive plans) 
based pay of all executive directors (top management team) scaled by the total number of 
executive directors.   
Corporate performance (independent) variables 
Q  Ratio of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to total  
assets.  
ROA   Percentage of operating profit to total assets. 
TSR  Natural log of continuously compounded total share return made up of capital gain and 
dividend yield. 
Corporate governance variables 
BOWN  Percentage of common shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total company 
shareholdings. 
BSIZ  Natural log of the total number of directors on the board of a company. 
IOWN   Percentage of common shares held by institutional shareholders. 
DOWN  Percentage of common shares held by directors. 
NBM  Number of board meetings in a year. 
NCOM  1, if a firm has a nomination committee consisting of a majority of independent non- 
executive directors as recommended by King II, 0 otherwise. 
NEDs   Percentage of non-executive directors to total number of directors on a board. 
RCOM  1, if a firm has a remuneration committee consisting entirely of independent non- 
                             executive directors as recommended by King II, 0 otherwise. 
CEO characteristics variables 
CEOA  CEO age: The age of a firm‟s CEO. 
CEOD  1, if the CEO is also the chairperson of the board of directors of a firm, 0 otherwise. 
CEOO  CEO ownership: Percentage of common shares held by a CEO of a firm.  
CEOP  CEO power: The ratio of CEO pay to the sum total of the pay of the top five executives. 
CEOR CEO reputation: The score (0 to 100) obtained by a firm‟s current CEO in the Sunday 
Times top 100 CEO/business leaders award in South Africa. Since 1960, the SA Sunday 
Times conducts annual peer survey of 100 best performing companies listed on the JSE 
based on a number of measures, including their past five years share returns. The 
rankings are decided by the Sunday Times previous year‟s top 100 ranked CEOs.  
CEOT  CEO tenure: The number of years that a firm‟s current CEO has been in that position. 
CEOD  1, if the CEO is also the chairperson of the board of directors of a firm, 0 otherwise. 
FCEO  Founding CEO: 1, if the current CEO of a firm is its founder, 0 otherwise. 
Control variables 
BIG4  1, if a firm is audited by a big four audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte &  
Touche, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise. 
CAPX  Percentage of total capital expenditure to total assets. 
CGCO  1, if a firm has set up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise 
CLIST  1, if a firm is listed on a foreign stock market, 0 otherwise.  
DIV  1, if a firm did pay out dividends in a financial year, 0 otherwise.  
LEV  Percentage of total debt to total assets. 
LNTA  Natural log of total assets.  
SGR Percentage of current year‟s sales minus previous year‟s sales scaled by previous year‟s 
sales. 
IND Dummies for each of the five main industries: basic material + oil & gas; consumer 
goods; consumer services + health care; industrials; technology + telecoms firms. 
YD  Dummies for each of the 10 years from 2003 to 2012 inclusive. 
 
 34 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of all variables for all (1,690) firm years. 
Variable                      Mean                 Median              Std. dev.           Maximum             Minimum 
Group A: Total executive (top management team) pay (dependent) variables 
CEO CASH (Rm)                       2.18                    1.37                    2.97                    13.18                    0.06 
CEO EQUITY (Rm)                   0.75                    0.44                    0.88                      3.80                    0.00 
CPAY (Rm)                                2.89                    1.78                    3.79                    16.86                    0.06 
TPAY CASH (Rm)                    11.28                    6.94                  11.36                    74.79                    0.11 
TPAY EQUITY (Rm)                  1.66                    0.98                    1.98                    12.40                    0.00 
TPAY (Rm)                               12.92                    7.86                  13.74                    87.54                    0.11 
Group B: Corporate performance (independent) variables 
Q                 1.58         1.38      0.72                    3.60                  0.72 
ROA (%)                  10.79       11.95    14.10                  37.85               -19.34  
TSR (%)                   28.38       25.24                 88.73                236.42               -48.29  
Group C: CEO power variables 
CEOA               52.94       53.00                   9.11                 81.00                34.00 
CEOD           0.23         0.00     0.43                   1.00     0.00 
CEOO (%)                   8.59         7.43     9.86                 67.85                  0.03 
CEOP                 0.48         0.44                   0.42                   0.80                  0.05 
CEOR                  29.86       26.00   33.31               100.00                  0.00 
CEOT                    7.36         6.80     8.09                 42.00                  0.25 
FCEO                    0.19         0.17     0.28                   1.00                  0.00 
Group D: Corporate governance structure variables 
BOWN (%)           62.43       64.74                 18.50                 91.80                10.21 
BSIZ                 9.80       10.00                   3.73                 18.00                  4.00 
DOWN (%)       19.32      88.79    18.34   78.84     1.42 
IOWN (%)                 74.32       82.26   22.90                 97.69                  9.42 
NBM          4.77        4.00      2.42   16.00     1.00 
NCOM                                      0.28                      0.00                   0.38                     1.00                      0.00 
NEDs (%)                  56.90       57.74   15.48                 84.28                17.36 
RCOM                                      0.14                      0.00                  0.35                    1.00     0.00 
Group E: Control variables 
BIG4                        0.73       1.00      0.44                  1.00                  0.00 
CAPX (%)       12.95        8.64    15.38   66.50                  7.28 
CGCO           0.32        0.00      0.47                  1.00                      0.00 
CLIST                  0.22        0.00      0.41                  1.00     0.00 
DIV           0.67        1.00      0.47                  1.00     0.00 
LEV (%)              17.76      16.36    13.70                 55.92                  5.13 
LNTA          5.94        6.10      0.56     7.88     4.24 
SGR (%)       12.35                   13.98                  26.53                   89.58                  -44.21 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: CEO total cash-based pay (CEO CASH) in millions of SA Rands (R in millions), CEO total 
equity-based pay (CEO EQUITY), CEO total pay (CPAY), total cash-based pay of all executive directors (TPAY CASH), total equity-
based pay of all executive directors (TPAY EQUITY), total pay of all executive directors (TPAY), Tobin‟s Q (Q), return on assets 
(ROA), total share return (TSR), CEO age (CEOA), CEO duality (CEOD), CEO ownership (CEOO), CEO power (CEOP), CEO 
reputation (CEOR), CEO tenure (CEOT), CEO duality (CEOD), founding CEO (FCEO), block ownership (BOWN), board size (BSIZ), 
director ownership (DOWN), institutional ownership (IOWN), the number of board meetings (NBM), the presence of an independent 
nomination committee (NCOM), the percentage of independent non-executive directors (NEDs), the presence of an independent 
remuneration committee (RCOM), audit firm size (BIG4), capital expenditure (CAPX), the presence of a CG committee (CGCO), 
cross-listing (CLIST), dividend payment status (DIV), leverage (LEV), firm size (LNTA), and sales growth (SGR). 
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Table 5. Pearson‟s and Spearman‟s correlation matrices of the variables for all 1,690 firm years 
Variable TPAY CPAY TSR CEOA CEOP CEOO CEOR CEOT CEOD FCEO BOWN BSIZ DOWN IOWN NCOM NEDs RCOM LEV LNTA SGR 
TPAY 1.00 .74***    .13**    .05    .40***    -.07    .28***    .10*    .01    .11**    .12**    .28***    -.15***    -.23***    -.21***    -.24**   -.28***    -.23***    .45***    .11**    
CPAY .69***    1.00 .15**    .08*    .47***    -.06    .35***    .17**    .08*    .19**    .23***    .32***    -.23***    -.28***    -.24***    -.27**    -.30***    -.27***    .48***    .15**    
TSR .08*    .11**    1.00 -.01    .05    .09*    .13**    -.06    -.05    .16**    -.12**    -.10*    .16***    .19**    .18**    .21***    .19**    -.10*   -.07    .19**    
CEOA .03    -.07    -.02    1.00 .14**    .03    .04    .09*    -.03    -.07    .14**    .07    -.06    -.07    -.02    -.04   -.07    -.02    -.01    -.02   
CEOP .36***    .42***    .06    .12**    1.00 .16**    .47***    .20***    .18** .20***    .16**    .11**    -.15***    -.20***    -.11**    -.16*    -.19**    .06    -.05    -.04    
CEOO -.02    -.04    .08    .07    .19**    1.00 -.02    .12**    -.05   .36***    .25***    .08*    .10*    -.12**    -.03   -.07   -.06    -.03    -.08*    -.00    
CEOR .30***    .46***    .12**    .09*    .20***    -.05    1.00 .14**    -.06    -.05   -.06    .11**    .05    .11**    -.02   -.04    -.05    .07    .02    -.00    
CEOT .08*    .13**    -.05    .07    .15**    .10*    .12**    1.00 .10*    .18**    .09*    .14**    -.08*    -.15***    -.11**    -.15**    -.19**    -.05    -.07    .05    
CEOD -.05    .11**    -.07    -.05    .20**    -.07    -.05    .12**    1.00   .22***    .18**    -.09*    -.09*    -.13***    -.02    -.04   -.06    -.03    -.03    .02    
FCEO .09*    .17**    .14**    -.03    .18**    .34***    -.07    .15**    .19**    1.00    .21***    .08*    .06    -.15**    -.03   -.07    -.05   -.08*    -.02    .00    
BOWN .14**    .18**    -.07    .12**    .13**    .22***    -.04    .07    .16**    .19**    1.00    -.10*    -.09*    -.10*    -.07    -.03    -.06    .06    -.09*    .00    
BSIZ .23***    .29***    -.06    .04    .09*    .20***    .09*    .12**    -.06    .04    -.08*    1.00    -.08*    -.09*    .18***    .16**    .14**    .17**    .30***    .00    
DOWN -.13**    -.19**    .14**    -.03    -.12**    .07    .02    -.06    -.05    .03    -.07    -.05    1.00    -.07    -.06    -.03    -.05    -.05    -.02    .02    
IOWN -.19**    -.23***    .15**    -.05    -.16**    -.10*    .08*    -.12**    -.10*    -.11**    -.08*    -.06    -.04    1.00    .18***    .16**    .17**    .03    .13**    -.04    
NCOM -.15**    -.19**    .10*    -.04   -.08*   .00    .05    -.10*    -.03    -.02    -.07    .11**    -.05    .13**    1.00    .30***    .38***    -.07    .16*    -.03    
NEDs -.13**    -.17**    .08*    -.06    -.12**    .02    .07    -.14**    -.05    -.03    -.05    .13**    -.03    -16**    .32***    1.00    .26**    -.04    .14**    .10*    
RCOM -.24***    -.28***    .13**    -.03    -.15**    .04    .04    -.17**    -.07    -.05    -.04    .15**   -.05    .14**    .35***    .20***    1.00 -.06    .19**    .08*    
LEV -.22**    -.24***    -.07    -.05    -.07    -.06    .09*    -.07    -.06    -.10*    .08*    .22***    -.07    .05    -.06    -.07    -.03   1.00    .34***    .03    
LNTA .42***     .46***    -.05    -.02    .05    -.10*   .04    -.05    -.07   -.05    -.11**    .33***    -.05    .16**    .18**    .20***    .14**    .25***    1.00    -.05    
SGR .08*    .12**    .16**    -.05    -.07    .03    -.03    .05   .06    .00    .01   .05    -.07    -.02    -.09*    .11**    .13**    .07    -.03    1.00    
Notes: The bottom left half of the table reports Pearson‟s parametric correlation coefficients, whilst the upper right half of the table presents Spearman‟s non-parametric correlation coefficients.  ***, **,  and * 
indicate correlation is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). Variables are defined as follows: total pay of all executive directors (TPAY), total CEO pay (CPAY), total 
shareholder return (TSR), CEO age (CEOA), CEO power (CEOP), CEO ownership (CEOO), CEO reputation (CEOR), CEO tenure (CEOT), CEO duality (CEOD), founding CEO (FCEO), block ownership 
(BOWN), director ownership (DOWN), institutional ownership (IOWN), the presence of an independent nomination committee (NCOM), percentage of independent non-executive directors (NEDs), the presence 
of an independent remuneration committee (RCOM), leverage (LEV), firm size (LNTA) and sales growth (SGR). Table 3 contains full definitions of all the variables employed. 
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Table 6. The effect of corporate performance on executive pay 
Dependent variable 
   ________________________________________________________________ 
                                                    All executive directors‟ pay                     CEO pay 
______________________________        ______________________________            
Independent variable  ∆Cash        ∆Non-cash    ∆Total               ∆Cash       ∆Non-cash    ∆Total  
Model                   (I)                   (II)               (III)                  (IV)                   (V)                 (VI) 
Corporate Performance variable: 
    ∆TSRt-1  0.029
**         0.051***  0.063***              0.048***        0.069***  0.095*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
Control variables: 
    ∆BIG4t-1  0.147
**         0.140**  0.175***              0.170**        0.180***   0.204
*** 
   (.034)         (.042)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000)    
   ∆CAPXt-1                        -0.030
**        -0.067*** -0.098***             -0.062**       -0.103*** -0.116*** 
   (.044)         (.010)  (.000)              (.020)        (.000)  (.000)  
    ∆CGCOt-1  -0.186
***         -0.177***
          
-0.202***
 
            -0.197***
  
     -0.205*** -0.210*** 
   (.000)         (.000) (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000)  
    ∆CLISTt-1                0.123
**         0.170*** 0.182***              0.140**        0.181***
  
0.195*** 
   (.029)         (.010) (.000)              (.019)        (.000)  (.000)  
    ∆DIVt-1  -0.120
**        -0.171**         -0.185***             -0.130**       -0.194*** -0.211*** 
   (.050)         (.020) (.009)              (.036)        (.000)  (.000) 
    ∆LEVt-1  -0.035
**        -0.040** -0.055**             -0.065***       -0.086*** -0.104*** 
   (.046)         (.032) (.016)              (.009)        (.000) (.000) 
   ∆LNTAt-1  0.210
***         0.238*** 0.262***              0.225***        0.246***  0.289***
 
   (.000)         (.000) (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
    ∆SGRt-1  0.106
***         0.120*** 0.145***
 
             0.134***        0.156***  0.172***
 
   (.000)         (.000) (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
    IND   Included         Included       Included             Included         Included        Included 
    YD   Included        Included       Included             Included         Included        Included 
Constant  1.674***          1.695***  1.686***
 
             1.896***        1.952***
 
          1.932***
 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)             (.000) 
F-value   6.254***         6.306*** 6.279***
  
            6.556***
 
       6.965***
  
6.784***
 
Adjusted R
2
  0.372         0.380 0.388              0.390        0.402  0.412 
N   1,521         1,521 1,521              1,521        1,521  1,521 
Notes: The table presents a median regression of changes (∆) in cash, non-cash and total pay of all executive directors and the CEO, 
respectively, on changes in shareholder wealth (corporate performance) and the control variables. P-values are in parentheses. 
Following Peterson (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust Clustered Standard Errors technique. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The other variables are defined as follows: changes (∆) in total share 
return (∆TSR), audit firm size (∆BIG4), capital expenditure (∆CAPX), the presence of a CG committee (∆CGCO), cross-listing 
(∆CLIST), dividend payment status (∆DIV), leverage (∆LEV), firm size (∆LNTA), sales growth (∆SGR), year (YD) and industry (IND) 
dummies. Table 3 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 7: Statistical comparisons of the differences in estimated PPS between CEOs and executive directors 
Variable PPS coefficient for 
executives 
PPS coefficient for 
CEOs 
T-test of PPS difference:  
(CEOs - Executives) 
Panel A: Estimated PPS coefficients from Table 6 
Cash (TSR) 0.029 0.048 0.019* 
Non-Cash (TSR) 0.051 0.069 0.018* 
Total (TSR) 0.063 0.095   0.032*** 
Panel B: Estimated PPS coefficients from Table 8 
Q 0.152 0.175 0.023** 
ROA 0.165 0.186 0.021** 
TSR 0.157 0.180 0.023** 
Panel C: Estimated PPS coefficients from Table 9 
Q 0.136 0.153 0.017* 
ROA 0.147 0.158 0.011* 
TSR 0.142 0.155 0.013* 
Panel D: Estimated PPS coefficients from Table 10 
PRE_TSR (Step 1) 0.140 0.144 0.004 
PRE_TSR (Step 2) 0.165 0.178   0.013** 
Panel E: Estimated PPS coefficients from Table 11 
PRE_TSR (Step 1) 0.130 0.141 0.011* 
PRE_TSR (Step 2) 0.149 0.169  0.020** 
Panel F: Estimated PPS coefficients from Table 12 
PRE_Q 0.160 0.182  0.022** 
PRE_ROA 0.171 0.196  0.025** 
PRE_TSR 0.165 0.194    0.029*** 
Panel G: Estimated PPS coefficients from Table 13 
PRE_Q 0.145 0.164  0.019* 
PRE_ROA 0.156 0.169  0.013* 
PRE_TSR 0.153 0.167  0.014* 
Notes: The table contains PPS coefficients estimated in Tables 6, and 8 to 13 for CEOs and all executive directors along with their differences 
(CEOs coefficients minus coefficients of all executive directors). ***, **, and * denote that the difference between the estimated PPS for CEOs 
and all executive directors  is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8. The moderating effect of CEO power on the pay-for-performance relationship  
Dependent variable 
   ________________________________________________________________ 
                                             ∆All executive directors‟ pay               ∆CEO pay 
            ____________________________          _________________________________            
Independent variable        ∆TPAY       ∆TPAY        ∆TPAY            ∆CPAY      ∆CPAY         ∆CPAY 
Model                                    (I)               (II)               (III)                      (IV)                (V)                  (VI) 
Corporate performance variable: 
     ∆Qt-1   0.152
***            -           -                     0.175***            -                     - 
   (.000)            -                   -              (.000)            -                     - 
    ∆ROAt-1       -         0.165
***    -                  -        0.186***      - 
        -         (.000)    -                  -        (.000)      - 
     ∆TSRt-1       -             -    0.157
**                  -             -                 0.180*** 
        -             -    (.000)                  -             -     (.000) 
CEO power variables: 
     ∆CEOAt-1               -0.012        -0.018 -0.015             -0.017       -0.025 -0.020 
   (.345)         (.320)  (.330)              (.323)        (.310)  (.316) 
    ∆CEODt-1  -0.005         -0.008 -0.006             -0.010       -0.016 -0.014 
   (.594)         (.573)  (.587)              (.562)        (.545)  (.552) 
    ∆CEOOt-1                0.203
***         0.209***  0.205***              0.216***        0.227***  0.220*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
     ∆CEOPt-1  -0.133
***        -0.139*** -0.136***             -0.140***       -0.147*** -0.143*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
     ∆CEORt-1                0.162
***         0.167***  0.165***              0.170***        0.177***  0.174*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
     ∆CEOTt-1               -0.102
**         -0.107** -0.105**              -0.109**        -0.115**  -0.112** 
   (.038)         (.032)  (.036)              (.030)        (.024)  (.028) 
     ∆FCEOt-1                0.053
*         0.060*  0.057*                 0.063*        0.067**  0.065** 
   (.064)         (.058)  (.060)              (.054)        (.048)  (.050) 
Interaction variables: 
    ∆P*CEOAt-1                  -0.003        -0.008 -0.005             -0.010       -0.016 -0.013 
   (.372)         (.364)  (.368)              (.349)        (.335)  (.340) 
    ∆P*CEODt-1  -0.001        -0.004 -0.002             -0.005       -0.010 -0.007 
   (.630)         (.610)  (.625)              (.596)        (.570)  (.585) 
   ∆P*CEOOt-1               0.182
***         0.188***  0.184***              0.197***        0.210***  0.206*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
   ∆P*CEOPt-1              -0.120
***        -0.127*** -0.123***             -0.129***       -0.136*** -0.133*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
   ∆P*CEORt-1               0.143
***         0.148***  0.145***              0.153***        0.159***  0.156*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
   ∆P*CEOTt-1  -0.078
*        -0.085** -0.082**             -0.090**       -0.097** -0.093** 
   (.052)         (.046)  (.049)              (.040)        (.035)  (.037) 
   ∆P*FCEOt-1                0.044
*         0.048*  0.046*              0.053*        0.059*  0.056* 
   (.077)         (.072)  (.074)              (.068)        (.063)  (.065)   
   ∆CONTROLS  Included         Included       Included             Included         Included        Included 
Constant  2.165***          2.187***  2.174***
 
             2.295***        2.467***
 
          2.325***
 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)             (.000) 
F-value   7.176***         7.341*** 7.269***
  
            7.508***
 
       7.757***
  
7.652***
 
Adjusted R
2
  0.442         0.448 0.443              0.452        0.469  0.464 
N   1,521         1,521 1,521              1,521        1,521  1,521 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Peterson (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust Clustered Standard 
Errors technique. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Δ is the first-difference operator and 
is applied to the variables as follows: Total executive pay (TPAY), total CEO pay (CPAY), Tobin‟s Q (∆Q), return on assets (∆ROA), 
total share return (∆TSR), CEO age (∆CEOA), CEO duality (∆CEOD), CEO ownership (∆CEOO), CEO power (∆CEOP), CEO 
reputation (∆CEOR), CEO tenure (∆CEOT) and founding CEO (∆FCEO). The next set of seven variables is interaction variables 
created for each CEO power and the three performance proxies, respectively. All the control variables introduced in Table 6 are 
included in each model, but for brevity not reported and available upon request. Table 3 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 9. The moderating effect of governance structure on the pay-for-performance relationship 
Dependent variable 
   ________________________________________________________________ 
                                             ∆All executive directors‟ pay               ∆CEO pay 
            ____________________________          _________________________________            
Independent variable        ∆TPAY       ∆TPAY        ∆TPAY           ∆CPAY      ∆CPAY          ∆CPAY 
Model                                    (I)               (II)               (III)                      (IV)                (V)                  (VI) 
Corporate performance variables: 
     ∆Qt-1   0.136
***            -           -                     0.153***            -                     - 
   (.000)            -                   -              (.000)            -                     - 
    ∆ROAt-1       -         0.147
***    -                  -        0.158***      - 
        -         (.000)    -                  -        (.000)      - 
     ∆TSRt-1       -             -    0.142
**                  -             -                 0.155*** 
        -             -    (.000)                  -             -     (.000) 
Corporate governance structure: 
    Ownership structure variables: 
     ∆BOWNt-1               -0.008        -0.014 -0.011             -0.013       -0.018 -0.016 
   (.520)         (.512)  (.515)              (.510)        (.492)  (.504) 
     ∆DOWNt-1  0.123
***         0.130***  0.127***              0.128***        0.136***  0.132*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
     ∆IOWNt-1                0.072
*         0.079*  0.076*              0.082*        0.090**  0.087** 
   (.064)         (.058)  (.060)              (.054)        (.048)  (.050) 
   Board structure variables: 
     ∆BSIZt-1               -0.243
***        -0.255*** -0.248***            -0.260***       -0.267*** -0.264*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
    ∆NBMt-1  0.019         0.028  0.025              0.029        0.037  0.033 
   (.373)         (.362)  (.367)              (.358)        (.349)  (.352) 
     ∆NCOMt-1                0.120
***         0.128***  0.124***              0.131***        0.139***  0.135*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
     ∆NEDst-1  -0.006         -0.009  -0.007              -0.008        -0.015  -0.011 
   (.593)         (.582)  (.586)              (.584)        (.577)  (.580) 
     ∆RCOMt-1                0.130
***         0.137***  0.133***              0.135***        0.140***  0.137*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
Interaction variables: 
  Ownership structure variables: 
    ∆P*BOWNt-1                 -0.001        -0.005 -0.003             -0.006       -0.009 -0.007 
   (.575)         (.562)  (.569)              (.545)        (.536)  (.540) 
    ∆P*DOWNt-1  0.107
***         0.115***  0.110***              0.117***        0.125***  0.120*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
   ∆P*IOWNt-1               0.060
*         0.067*  0.064*              0.069*        0.075*  0.073* 
   (.089)         (.084)  (.087)              (.081)        (.070)  (.074) 
  Board structure variables: 
   ∆P*BSIZt-1              -0.225
***        -0.234*** -0.229***            -0.235***       -0.243*** -0.240*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
   ∆P*NBMt-1  0.002         0.005  0.003              0.006        0.009  0.007 
   (.439)         (.428)  (.430)              (.425)        (.418)  (.420) 
   ∆P*NCOMt-1               0.109
***         0.117***  0.114***              0.119***        0.126***  0.122*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
   ∆P*NEDst-1  -0.001         -0.005  -0.003              -0.008        -0.014  -0.010 
   (.630)         (.622)  (.627)              (.611)        (.600)  (.608) 
   ∆P*RCOMt-1               0.118
***        -0.125*** -0.123***             -0.126***       -0.132*** -0.129*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000)   
   ∆CONTROLS  Included         Included       Included             Included         Included        Included 
Constant  2.365***          2.394***  2.375***
 
             2.492***        2.637***
 
          2.573***
 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)             (.000) 
F-value   8.057***         8.169*** 8.112***
  
            8.176***
 
       8.207***
  
8.194***
 
Adjusted R
2
  0.453         0.462 0.458              0.465        0.474  0.469 
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N   1,521         1,521 1,521              1,521        1,521  1,521 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Peterson (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust Clustered Standard 
Errors technique. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Δ is the first-difference operator and 
is applied to the variables as follows: Total executive pay (TPAY), total CEO pay (CPAY), Tobin‟s Q (∆Q), return on assets (∆ROA), 
total share return (∆TSR), block ownership (∆BOWN), director ownership (DOWN), institutional ownership (∆IOWN), board size 
(∆BSIZ), number of board meetings (∆NBM), the presence of an independent nomination committee (∆NCOM), percentage of 
independent non-executive directors (∆NEDs) and the presence of an independent remuneration committee (∆RCOM). The next set of 
eight variables is interaction variables created for each governance mechanism and the three performance proxies, respectively. All the 
control variables introduced in Table 6 are included in each model, but for brevity not reported and available upon request. Table 3 
fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 10. The moderating effect of CEO power on the PPS using a two-step multilevel regression  
Dependent variable 
            ________________________________________________________________  
                                            ∆All executive directors‟ pay                              ∆CEO pay  
           ____________________________            _______________________________              
Independent variable        ∆TPAY                             ∆TPAY              ∆CPAY                           ∆CPAY 
Model (Hierarchical)       (Step 1)                             (Step 2)                 (Step 1)                              (Step 2) 
Corporate performance variable: 
     ∆PRE_TSRt  0.140
***                           0.165***                0.144***                             0.178*** 
   (.000)                             (.000)              (.000)                            (.000) 
CEO power variables: 
      ∆CEOAt               -0.007                 -0.022             -0.016                  -0.033 
   (.462)                  (.296)              (.321)                   (.285) 
     ∆CEODt  -0.005                 -0.020             -0.010                 -0.025 
   (.584)                  (.528)              (.552)                  (.511) 
     ∆CEOOt                0.186
***                   0.263***              0.202***                  0.244*** 
   (.000)                  (.000)              (.000)                  (.000) 
     ∆CEOPt  -0.129
***                 -0.151***             -0.135***                 -0.158*** 
   (.000)                   (.000)              (.000)                   (.000)                        
     ∆CEORt                0.157
***                  0.183***              0.162***                  0.194*** 
   (.000)                  (.000)              (.000)                  (.000) 
     ∆CEOTt               -0.101
**                 -0.120**              -0.108**                  -0.133*** 
   (.035)                  (.030)              (.034)                  (.010) 
     ∆FCEOt                0.049
*                  0.088**                 0.060**                   0.095** 
   (.086)                  (.036)              (.047)                  (.024) 
Interaction variables: 
    ∆P*CEOAt                          -                  -0.020                   -                 -0.032 
        -                   (.337)                   -                  (.287) 
    ∆P*CEODt       -                 -0.013                   -                 -0.030 
        -                  (.568)                   -                   (.498) 
    ∆P*CEOOt                    -                  0.207
***                   -                   0.225*** 
       -                  (.000)                   -                  (.000) 
    ∆P*CEOPt                    -                  -0.149
***                   -                 -0.157*** 
       -                   (.000)                   -                  (.000) 
   ∆P*CEORt                    -                   0.165
***                   -                  0.179*** 
       -                  (.000)                   -                   (.000) 
   ∆P*CEOTt      -                  -0.096
**                   -                 -0.118** 
       -                   (.034)                   -                  (.025) 
   ∆P*FCEOt                   -                   0.045
*                   -                  0.080** 
      -                  (.090)                   -                   (.042)   
   ∆CONTROLS  Included                           Included             Included                                Included 
Constant  2.132***                    2.502***
 
             2.365***                     
 
          2.790***
 
   (.000)                   (.000)              (.000)                              (.000) 
F-value   5.538***                   6.988***
  
            6.082***
 
               
  
7.620***
 
Adjusted R
2
  0.356 ∆R2: 0.094          0.450              0.364   ∆R2: 0.119      0.483 
N   1,521                  1,521              1,521                   1,521 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Peterson (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust Clustered Standard 
Errors technique. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Δ is the first-difference operator and 
is applied to the variables as follows: Predicted total shareholder return (∆PRE_TSR), CEO age (∆CEOA), CEO duality (∆CEOD), 
CEO ownership (∆CEOO), CEO power (∆CEOP), CEO reputation (∆CEOR), CEO tenure (∆CEOT) and founding CEO (∆FCEO). 
The next set of seven variables is interaction variables created for each CEO power and performance (TSR) proxies, respectively. All 
the control variables introduced in Table 6 are included in each model, but for brevity not reported and available upon request. Table 3 
fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 11. The moderating effect of CG structure on the PPS using a two-step multilevel regression  
Dependent variable 
             ________________________________________________________________ 
                                         ∆All executive directors‟ pay                                           ∆CEO pay 
            ____________________________          ________________________________            
Independent variable        ∆TPAY                          ∆TPAY           ∆CPAY                             ∆CPAY 
Model  (Hierarchical)      (Step 1)                           (Step 2)                  (Step 1)                                  (Step 2) 
Corporate performance variable: 
     ∆PRE_TSRt  0.130
***                          0.149***                 0.141***                             0.167*** 
   (.000)                            (.000)              (.000)                             (.000) 
Corporate governance structure: 
    Ownership structure variables: 
     ∆BOWNt               -0.020                  -0.027             -0.025                  -0.033 
   (.486)                   (.469)              (.472)                  (.454) 
     ∆DOWNt  0.132
***                   0.138***              0.143***                  0.156*** 
   (.000)                  (.000)              (.000)                  (.000) 
     ∆IOWNt                0.098
**                   0.104**              0.107**                  0.110** 
   (.050)                  (.047)              (.040)                  (.029) 
   Board structure variables: 
     ∆BSIZt               -0.260
***                 -0.275***            -0.278***                 -0.285*** 
   (.000)                  (.000)              (.000)                  (.000) 
    ∆NBMt  0.032                   0.036              0.038                   0.046 
   (.345)                  (.340)              (.337)                   (.323) 
     ∆NCOMt                0.138
***                  0.149***              0.145***                   0.158*** 
   (.000)                  (.000)              (.000)                  (.000) 
     ∆NEDst  -0.020                  -0.026              -0.023                  -0.036 
   (.554)                  (.540)              (.545)                  (.533) 
     ∆RCOMt                0.141
***                  0.150***              0.146***                  0.158*** 
   (.000)                  (.000)              (.000)                  (.000) 
Interaction variables: 
  Ownership structure variables: 
    ∆P*BOWNt                         -                 -0.013                  -                  -0.025 
        -                  (.532)                  -                  (.506) 
    ∆P*DOWNt       -                  0.129
***                  -                   0.134*** 
        -                  (.000)                  -                  (.000) 
   ∆P*IOWNt                    -                  0.090
*                  -                  0.097** 
       -                  (.060)                  -                   (.050) 
  Board structure variables: 
   ∆P*BSIZt                    -                  -0.252
***                 -                 -0.265*** 
       -                   (.000)                  -                  (.000) 
   ∆P*NBMt      -                   0.025                  -                  0.047 
       -                  (.364)                  -                   (.330) 
   ∆P*NCOMt                   -                   0.132
***                  -                   0.146*** 
       -                   (.000)                  -                  (.000) 
   ∆P*NEDst      -                  -0.022                  -                  -0.037 
       -                  (.584)                  -                  (.569) 
   ∆P*RCOMt                    -                              -0.135
***                  -                 -0.147*** 
       -                  (.000)                  -                   (.000)   
   ∆CONTROLS  Included                            Included             Included                                Included 
Constant  2.423***                    2.652***
 
             2.504***                    
 
          2.846***
 
   (.000)                   (.000)              (.000)                               (.000) 
F-value   6.576***                 7.689***
  
            6.865***
 
               
  
8.531***
 
Adjusted R
2
  0.383    ∆R2: 0.078          0.461             0.398    ∆R2: 0.107     0.490 
N   1,521                     1,521              1,521                   1,521 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Peterson (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust Clustered Standard 
Errors technique. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Δ is the first-difference operator and 
is applied to the variables as follows: predicted total shareholder return (∆PRE_TSR), block ownership (∆BOWN), director ownership 
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(DOWN), institutional ownership (∆IOWN), board size (∆BSIZ), number of board meetings (∆NBM), the presence of an independent 
nomination committee (∆NCOM), percentage of independent non-executive directors (∆NEDs) and the presence of an independent 
remuneration committee (∆RCOM). The next set of eight variables is interaction variables created for each governance mechanism and 
the performance (TSR) proxies, respectively. All the control variables introduced in Table 6 are included in each model, but for brevity 
not reported and available upon request. Table 3 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 12. The moderating effect of CEO power on the pay-for-performance relationship with 2SLS  
Dependent variable 
            ________________________________________________________________  
                                        ∆All executive directors‟ pay (2SLS)                           ∆CEO pay (2SLS) 
           ____________________________            _______________________________              
Independent variable        ∆TPAY       ∆TPAY        ∆TPAY            ∆CPAY      ∆CPAY         ∆CPAY 
Model                                    (I)               (II)               (III)                      (IV)                (V)                  (VI) 
Corporate performance variable: 
     ∆PRE_Qt  0.160
***            -           -                     0.182***            -                     - 
   (.000)            -                   -              (.000)            -                     - 
    ∆PRE_ROAt       -         0.171
***    -                  -        0.196***      - 
        -         (.000)    -                  -        (.000)      - 
     ∆PRE_TSRt       -             -    0.165
**                  -             -                 0.194*** 
        -             -    (.000)                  -             -     (.000) 
CEO power variables: 
      ∆CEOAt               -0.018        -0.023 -0.020             -0.021       -0.029 -0.027 
   (.318)         (.305)  (.311)              (.308)        (.295)  (.298) 
     ∆CEODt  -0.010         -0.015 -0.013             -0.017       -0.022 -0.019 
   (.560)         (.542)  (.550)              (.538)        (.527)  (.530) 
     ∆CEOOt                0.217
***         0.226***  0.222***              0.228***        0.237***  0.231*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
     ∆CEOPt  -0.142
***        -0.148*** -0.145***             -0.147***       -0.154*** -0.150*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000)                        
     ∆CEORt                0.174
***         0.180***  0.177***              0.181***        0.189***  0.187*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
     ∆CEOTt               -0.109
**         -0.116** -0.111**              -0.117**        -0.125**  -0.121** 
   (.029)         (.022)  (.027)              (.024)        (.013)  (.016) 
     ∆FCEOt                0.064
*         0.075**  0.071**                 0.076**        0.085**  0.080** 
   (.051)         (.040)  (.044)              (.038)        (.030)  (.033) 
Interaction variables: 
    ∆P*CEOAt                    -0.008        -0.013 -0.010             -0.016       -0.022 -0.019 
   (.359)         (.340)  (.347)              (.332)        (.328)  (.330) 
    ∆P*CEODt  -0.005        -0.010 -0.007             -0.009       -0.019 -0.015 
   (.592)         (.569)  (.583)              (.572)        (.556)  (.559) 
    ∆P*CEOOt               0.193
***         0.199***  0.195***              0.203***        0.220***  0.213*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
    ∆P*CEOPt              -0.127
***        -0.135*** -0.131***             -0.133***       -0.142*** -0.139*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
   ∆P*CEORt               0.155
***         0.162***  0.159***              0.165***        0.174***  0.170*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
   ∆P*CEOTt  -0.085
**        -0.095** -0.090**             -0.097**       -0.105** -0.101** 
   (.044)         (.037)  (.040)              (.033)        (.026)  (.030) 
   ∆P*FCEOt                0.056
*         0.064*  0.061*              0.065*        0.070**  0.068* 
   (.065)         (.058)  (.060)              (.056)        (.049)  (.053)   
   ∆CONTROLS  Included         Included       Included             Included         Included        Included 
Constant  2.475***          2.598***  2.485***
 
             2.775***        2.896***
 
          2.782***
 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)             (.000) 
F-value   7.480***         7.594*** 7.487***
  
            7.726***
 
       7.960***
  
7.843***
 
Adjusted R
2
  0.458         0.465 0.460              0.472        0.478  0.475 
N   1,521         1,521 1,521              1,521        1,521  1,521 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Peterson (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust Clustered Standard 
Errors technique. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Δ is the first-difference operator and 
is applied to the variables as follows: Predicted Tobin‟s Q (∆PRE_Q), predicted return on assets (∆PRE_ROA), predicted total share 
return (∆PRE_TSR), CEO age (∆CEOA), CEO duality (∆CEOD), CEO ownership (∆CEOO), CEO power (∆CEOP), CEO reputation 
(∆CEOR), CEO tenure (∆CEOT) and founding CEO (∆FCEO). The next set of seven variables is interaction variables created for each 
CEO power and the three performance proxies, respectively. All the control variables introduced in Table 6 are included in each 
model, but for brevity not reported and available upon request. Table 3 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 13. The moderating effect of CG structures on the pay-for-performance relationship with 2SLS 
Dependent variable 
             ________________________________________________________________ 
                                         ∆All executive directors‟ pay (2SLS)                         ∆CEO pay (2SLS) 
            ____________________________          ________________________________            
Independent variable        ∆TPAY       ∆TPAY        ∆TPAY           ∆CPAY      ∆CPAY          ∆CPAY 
Model                                    (I)               (II)               (III)                      (IV)                (V)                  (VI) 
Corporate performance variable: 
     ∆PRE_Qt  0.145
***            -           -                     0.164***            -                     - 
   (.000)            -                   -              (.000)            -                     - 
    ∆PRE_ROAt       -         0.156
***    -                  -        0.169***      - 
        -         (.000)    -                  -        (.000)      - 
     ∆PRE_TSRt       -             -    0.153
**                  -             -                 0.167*** 
        -             -    (.000)                  -             -     (.000) 
Corporate governance structure: 
    Ownership structure variables: 
     ∆BOWNt               -0.015        -0.019 -0.017             -0.020       -0.028 -0.025 
   (.510)         (.487)  (.492)              (.485)        (.480)  (.504) 
     ∆DOWNt  0.129
***         0.136***  0.133***              0.137***        0.144***  0.140*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
     ∆IOWNt                0.082
*         0.088**  0.086*              0.091**        0.098**  0.095** 
   (.053)         (.049)  (.051)              (.046)        (.037)  (.040) 
   Board structure variables: 
     ∆BSIZt               -0.255
***        -0.267*** -0.262***            -0.271***       -0.278*** -0.274*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
    ∆NBMt  0.027         0.036  0.030              0.034        0.039  0.037 
   (.362)         (.350)  (.359)              (.352)        (.341)  (.344) 
     ∆NCOMt                0.129
***         0.137***  0.135***              0.138***        0.148***  0.146*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
     ∆NEDst  -0.016         -0.021  -0.018              -0.024        -0.029  -0.026 
   (.575)         (.564)  (.569)              (.557)        (.548)  (.550) 
     ∆RCOMt                0.135
***         0.145***  0.141***              0.144***        0.149***  0.147*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
Interaction variables: 
  Ownership structure variables: 
    ∆P*BOWNt                   -0.005        -0.009 -0.007             -0.011       -0.018 -0.016 
   (.546)         (.537)  (.541)              (.534)        (.523)  (.529) 
    ∆P*DOWNt  0.116
***         0.125***  0.122***              0.126***        0.132***  0.129*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
   ∆P*IOWNt               0.073
*         0.086*  0.081*              0.087*        0.094*  0.090* 
   (.072)         (.065)  (.068)              (.063)        (.057)  (.060) 
  Board structure variables: 
   ∆P*BSIZt              -0.235
***        -0.247*** -0.241***            -0.249***       -0.258*** -0.252*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
   ∆P*NBMt  0.013         0.019  0.016              0.020        0.028  0.024 
   (.395)         (.383)  (.389)              (.381)        (.369)  (.373) 
   ∆P*NCOMt               0.118
***         0.127***  0.124***              0.128***         0.137***  0.133*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
   ∆P*NEDst  -0.009         -0.015  -0.011              -0.017        -0.025  -0.021 
   (.610)         (.598)  (.605)              (.592)        (.587)  (.590) 
   ∆P*RCOMt               0.126
***        -0.132*** -0.129***             -0.133***       -0.138*** -0.136*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000)   
   ∆CONTROLS  Included         Included       Included             Included         Included        Included 
Constant  2.780***          2.798***  2.791***
 
             2.972***        2.995***
 
          2.983***
 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)             (.000) 
F-value   8.783***         8.797*** 8.792***
  
            8.978***
 
       8.993***
  
8.987***
 
Adjusted R
2
  0.482         0.488 0.485              0.492        0.497  0.494 
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N   1,521         1,521 1,521              1,521        1,521  1,521 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Peterson (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust Clustered Standard 
Errors technique. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Δ is the first-difference operator and 
is applied to the variables as follows: predicted Tobin‟s Q (∆PRE_Q), predicted return on assets (∆PRE_ROA), predicted total share 
return (∆PRE_TSR), block ownership (∆BOWN), director ownership (DOWN), institutional ownership (∆IOWN), board size (∆BSIZ), 
number of board meetings (∆NBM), the presence of an independent nomination committee (∆NCOM), percentage of independent non-
executive directors (∆NEDs) and the presence of an independent remuneration committee (∆RCOM). The next set of eight variables is 
interaction variables created for each governance mechanism and the three performance proxies, respectively. All the control variables 
introduced in Table 6 are included in each model, but for brevity not reported and available upon request. Table 3 fully defines all the 
variables used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
